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ARTICLE 
OF SPEECH AND SANCTIONS: TOWARD A PENALTY-
SENSITIVE APPROACH TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Michael Coenen* 
Courts confronting First Amendment claims do not often scrutinize 
the severity of a speaker’s punishment. Embracing a “penalty-neutral” 
understanding of the free speech right, these courts tend to treat an indi-
vidual’s expression as either protected, in which case the government 
may not punish it at all, or unprotected, in which case the government 
may punish it to a very great degree. There is, however, a small but im-
portant body of “penalty-sensitive” case law that runs counter to the 
penalty-neutral norm. Within this case law, the severity of a speaker’s 
punishment affects the merits of her First Amendment claim, thus giving 
rise to categories of expression that the government may punish, but only 
to a limited extent. This Article defends penalty-sensitive free speech ad-
judication and calls for its expanded use within First Amendment law. 
Pulling together existing strands of penalty-sensitive doctrine, the Article 
identifies five ways in which penalty-sensitive analysis can further im-
portant constitutional objectives: (a) by increasing fairness for similarly 
situated speakers; (b) by mitigating chilling effects on protected speech; 
(c) by facilitating the “efficient breach” of constitutionally borderline
speech restrictions; (d) by rooting out improper government motives; and
(e) by promoting transparency in judicial decisionmaking. The Article
also considers and rejects potential objections to the penalty-sensitive ap-
proach, concluding that it will often generate proper results in difficult
First Amendment cases.
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INTRODUCTION 
Governments restrict speech by punishing speakers.1 They incarcer-
ate inciters,2 make defamers pay damages,3 and put pornographers on 
probation.4 They fine broadcasters,5 enjoin publishers,6 and sanction 
internet service providers.7 They lengthen the sentences of hate crime 
defendants8 and hold loose-lipped litigants in contempt of court.9 They 
fire employees who criticize superiors,10 discipline schoolchildren who 
protest in the classroom,11 and withhold subsidies from applicants who 
espouse disfavored beliefs.12 In these and other circumstances, state ac-
tors implicate the free speech right not just by imposing restrictions on 
expressive behavior, but also by fortifying these restrictions with the 
threat and exaction of punishment. 
 
1. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (“The normal method of 
deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who 
engages in it.”). 
2. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–45 (1969) (reviewing free 
speech claim of defendant sentenced to one to ten years’ imprisonment (and fined 
$1,000) under Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute). 
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (addressing First 
Amendment issues arising from $500,000 defamation verdict). 
4. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to obscenity prosecutions); see also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 
354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957) (describing sentence of one defendant in Roth as two years’ pro-
bation). 
5. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 323 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(noting FCC issued $8 million in fines for indecency violations in 2004), cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 3065 (2011). 
6. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (reviewing district court 
order enjoining publication of allegedly defamatory periodical). 
7. See, e.g., John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 2008) (addressing 
internet service provider’s First Amendment challenge to statutory requirements prohibit-
ing disclosure of investigative requests). 
8. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479–81 (1993) (reviewing two-year 
enhancement of aggravated battery sentence under Wisconsin hate crime statute). 
9. See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 703–04 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (discussing contempt citation and resulting $50 fine issued against witness who 
used term “chicken shit” in open court). 
10. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 565 
(1968) (reviewing school district’s dismissal of teacher for criticizing school board in letter 
to local newspaper). 
11. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) 
(reviewing public school’s suspension of students who wore black armbands in protest of 
Vietnam War). 
12. See, e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (reviewing statutory require-
ment that National Endowment for the Arts “‘tak[e] into consideration general standards 
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public’” in re-
viewing grant applications (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) 
(2006))). 
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While punishments lie at the core of real-life First Amendment dis-
putes, they occupy only the peripheries of First Amendment analysis. In 
particular, the severity of the penalty imposed—though of central impor-
tance to the speaker who bears it—does not normally affect the merits of 
his free speech claim. Fighting words doctrine does not distinguish be-
tween ordinances that punish with fines and those that punish with im-
prisonment.13 Commercial speech doctrine does not distinguish between 
large and small monetary penalties.14 Public employment doctrine does 
not distinguish between temporary suspensions and permanent dismiss-
als.15 Much free speech review follows this pattern, asking the question of 
whether, and not to what extent, the government may punish expressive 
conduct. Consequently, First Amendment litigation tends to proceed as a 
winner-take-all affair. Speech is either protected, in which case it may not 
be punished, or unprotected, in which case it may be punished to a very 
great degree.16 In this respect, the standard method of First Amendment 
analysis is penalty-neutral. 
This penalty-neutral approach to free speech adjudication is no 
doubt familiar to students of First Amendment law. Less familiar is its 
penalty-sensitive alternative, which treats the severity of a speaker’s pun-
ishment as relevant to the merits of his First Amendment claim. On a 
penalty-sensitive understanding of the free speech right, some forms of 
expression warrant neither total immunization against nor total exposure 
to the threat of government-sponsored sanction. Rather, for such expres-
sion, the First Amendment permits some forms of punishment but not 
others. Thus, to the penalty-sensitive analyst, it matters whether prison 
sentences are long or short, whether civil damage awards are large or 
small, whether public workplace dismissals are permanent or temporary, 
and so on. Such an analyst asks not just, “What kinds of speech may the 
government sanction?” She also asks, “What kinds of sanctions may the 
government impose on speech?” 
Without a doubt, penalty sensitivity is an uncommon feature of the 
First Amendment landscape. Indeed, it is sufficiently uncommon that, 
 
13. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are cer-
tain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . . 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”). 
14. Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489, 493 (1996) (invalidat-
ing enforcement action resulting in collection of $400 fine). 
15. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) (observing “there are 
deprivations less harsh than dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and appli-
cants to conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy”). But see 
infra Part II.A.3 (noting limited instances of penalty-sensitivity in public employment 
cases). 
16. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 
Minn. L. Rev. 11, 27 (1981) (noting “[l]ong criminal sentences and enormous civil dam-
age awards are not uncommon, even for speech at the margins of constitutional protec-
tion”). 
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among those few scholars who have paused to consider the matter, there 
is general agreement that courts reviewing free speech cases rarely, if 
ever, employ the penalty-sensitive approach. Hence, Christine Jolls, Cass 
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler have observed that “no one has suggested 
that the First Amendment imposes limits on the severity of punishment 
for speech that the government is entitled to criminalize.”17 Vincent Blasi 
has similarly noted that, with one “limited” exception, “the Supreme 
Court has been unwilling to erect constitutional limitations on how se-
verely persons can be sanctioned for engaging in unprotected expres-
sion.”18 Such conclusions comport with statements from the Court itself, 
whose members have sometimes rejected, in no uncertain terms, the idea 
of imposing penalty-based limits on the government’s power to restrict 
speech. In declining to impose such limits, the Court has proclaimed, for 
instance, that “the First Amendment . . . protects state employees . . . 
from ‘even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party 
for a public employee’”19 and that “it is not for this Court to limit the 
State in resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law.”20 Under-
stood in isolation, such statements might be read to indicate that free 
speech adjudication is an exclusively penalty-neutral affair. 
This view, however, is too strong. Penalty-sensitive free speech analy-
sis may be less prevalent than its penalty-neutral counterpart, but it is by 
no means nonexistent. Indeed, the Court, individual Justices, and some 
lower courts have tinkered with penalty-sensitive analysis in a variety of 
free speech settings. One finds penalty sensitivity at work, for example, in 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, which 
characterized lengthy prison sentences for seditious libel as a significant 
First Amendment problem.21 More recently, the Court assumed a 
penalty-sensitive stance in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, where, in upholding 
an FCC enforcement action against First Amendment attack, it pointed 
to the lenience of the sanction imposed.22 Penalty sensitivity manifests 
itself in the Court’s practice of reviewing First Amendment vagueness 
and overbreadth claims more aggressively in the criminal context than in 
 
17. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1517 (1998). 
18. Blasi, supra note 16, at 26–27; see also Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and 
Freedom of Expression, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 999, 1039 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has at 
best only suggested that excess punishments may render a restriction on speech more re-
strictive than necessary.”). 
19. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 
954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 497 U.S. 62); see also Smith v. Fruin, 28 
F.3d 646, 649 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[E]ven minor forms of retaliation can support a First 
Amendment claim, for they may have just as much of a chilling effect on speech as more 
drastic measures.”). 
20. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989) (quoting Kingsley 
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957)). 
21. 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
22. 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978). 
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the civil context, and in some lower courts’ refusal to extend First 
Amendment protection to public employees who have not suffered suffi-
ciently “adverse” forms of retaliation. Penalty-sensitive analysis underlies 
the rule of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which permits states to award “actual 
damages,” but not presumed or punitive damages, in certain categories 
of defamation actions.23 In these and other cases, courts have signaled 
that the scope of the free speech right depends on the harshness of the 
penalty administered. 
The shared penalty-sensitive character of these cases has gone 
largely unnoticed—and hence unevaluated—by judges and scholars 
alike. When it has flirted with penalty-sensitive review, the Court has pro-
ceeded in an ad hoc manner, neglecting to explain why, how, or when 
the severity of a speaker’s penalty should affect the scope of his First 
Amendment rights. And legal academics have left this field unexplored. 
Although some scholars have discussed individual areas of doctrine in 
penalty-sensitive terms,24 no one has previously tied these doctrinal lines 
together or evaluated in general the merits and demerits of the penalty-
sensitive approach. One thus searches the case law and legal literature in 
vain for a systematic assessment of penalty-sensitive free speech analysis. 
Given penalty sensitivity’s now limited—but still unmistakable—
presence within First Amendment law, it is well worth asking whether this 
sort of analysis ought to be included. Should we regard existing examples 
of penalty-sensitive analysis as aberrant mistakes not to be repeated? Or 
should we regard them as the scattered seeds of a promising doctrinal 
development? What, in short, are the promises and pitfalls of penalty-
sensitive free speech analysis? And if this approach does have merit, how 
should courts pursue it? 
 
23. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
24. See, e.g., Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage 
in Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 379, 448 (2006) (inquiring “whether the 
First Amendment limits the severity of the penalties that may be imposed for false state-
ments by corporations”); Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 782, 817 (1986) (“[O]ne clear defect of the actual malice requirement of New 
York Times is that by making basic liability turn on subjective intentions, it blurs the line 
between actual and punitive damages and thereby unwittingly simplifies the recovery of 
the latter.”); Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping 
Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1288 (1988) (“I suggest that recogni-
tion of a no-damages libel suit, free of Sullivan’s actual malice requirement, would im-
prove the efficiency of the cause of action, and reduce its costs and burdens for both de-
fendants and plaintiffs.”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VII’s Adverse 
Action Requirement on First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Gov-
ernment Employee Speech, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 669, 693–99 (2005) (discussing emergence of 
penalty-sensitive “adverse action” requirement for public employees’ First Amendment 
retaliation claims); William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery 
from the Press—An Extended Comment on “The Anderson Solution,” 25 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 793, 802-09 (1984) (discussing penalty-sensitive aspects of Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, 
as well as problem of punitive damages in defamation proceedings). 
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This Article addresses these questions. Pulling together existing 
strands of penalty-sensitive doctrine, it argues that, while penalty sensitiv-
ity’s utility will vary from case to case, the approach is fully capable of fur-
thering salutary constitutional objectives. Penalty-sensitive analysis can, 
for example, equalize constitutional treatment of similarly situated 
speakers, root out improper motives, facilitate “efficient breaches” of 
constitutionally problematic speech restrictions, and increase the trans-
parency of judicial decisionmaking. What is more, the potential prob-
lems presented by the penalty-sensitive approach are not unduly severe. 
Penalty-sensitive rules and rulings comport with traditional understand-
ings of the judicial role. They are workable in practice. And they do not 
threaten to vitiate the free speech guarantee. For all these reasons, courts 
should seek to build upon the penalty-sensitive foundations they have al-
ready laid down. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II advance the descrip-
tive thesis of this Article, with Part I outlining the criteria of penalty-
sensitive analysis and Part II cataloging existing examples of penalty-
sensitive analysis arising within both First Amendment law and case law 
involving other constitutional rights. Parts III and IV then defend penalty 
sensitivity as a worthwhile form of free speech review. Part III explains 
how penalty-sensitive free speech review serves beneficial purposes: pro-
moting fair judicial outcomes, mitigating chilling effects, “preserving” 
unprotected speech, screening for improper government motives, and 
enhancing transparency. Part IV anticipates and rebuts objections to the 
practice, including the claims that it is illegitimate, that it is too difficult 
to implement, and that it will undermine the free speech guarantee. 
Before proceeding further, let me offer three clarifications regard-
ing the scope of the project. First, this is not an Article about how to con-
ceptualize the relationship between penalty-sensitive doctrine and the 
precise meaning of the Free Speech Clause. The descriptive analysis sets 
aside the question whether penalty-sensitive rules derive from a straight-
forward reading of the First Amendment’s prohibition on “abridging the 
freedom of speech”25 or whether penalty-sensitive doctrine is better re-
garded as embodying a set of “constitutional decision rules” designed to 
facilitate indirect or prophylactic judicial enforcement of this prohibi-
tion.26 And the normative analysis does not address the textual or histori-
 
25. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added). 
26. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15 
(2004) (distinguishing between “constitutional operative propositions (judicial statements 
of what the Constitution means)” and “constitutional decision rules (judicial statements of 
how courts should decide whether the operative propositions have been complied with)” 
(emphasis omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 57 (1997) (arguing “the Court must 
often craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution but does not reflect the 
Constitution’s meaning precisely”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How 
the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1655–58 (2005) (evaluating 
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cal legitimacy of penalty-sensitive review. These issues matter, and they 
may affect some people’s attitudes toward the penalty-sensitive approach. 
But they lie beyond the reach of this Article, which concerns penalty sen-
sitivity’s existing presence in First Amendment doctrine and its useful-
ness as a tool of free speech analysis. 
Second, in endorsing penalty sensitivity as a method of First 
Amendment analysis, this Article takes no position on whether, as a gen-
eral matter, First Amendment doctrine should be more or less protective 
of speech than is currently the case. As Part IV.C explains further, 
penalty-sensitive free speech review is capable of both expanding and 
shrinking the zone of First Amendment protection, and this Article does 
not advocate for one application over the other. That is not to say that 
the long-term consequences of incorporating penalty-sensitive review 
into First Amendment law are irrelevant to the analysis that follows; any 
appraisal of penalty-sensitive review must ask, as this one does, whether 
the method will tend to strengthen or weaken the First Amendment’s 
rights-vindicating effects.27 In the end, however, this Article is about how 
to draw First Amendment boundaries, not where those boundaries 
should lie. 
Finally, the Article’s primary focus on the freedom of speech should 
not be taken to imply that free speech cases are uniquely amenable to 
the penalty-sensitive approach. If anything, the arguments here may lead 
to a different conclusion: namely, that penalty sensitivity is capable of 
improving not only free speech doctrine but other areas of constitutional 
doctrine as well. One might, for instance, employ penalty-sensitive analy-
sis in cases involving the free exercise right, substantive and procedural 
due process rights, and the newly revitalized right to bear arms.28 To be 
sure, these observations are only preliminary: How, why, and to what ex-
tent penalty-sensitive analysis should occur outside the free speech set-
ting are questions more raised than answered in the discussion that fol-
lows. For now, however, it suffices to note that this Article’s largely posi-
tive story about penalty-sensitive analysis and the freedom of speech sug-
 
decision rules model); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978) (“[C]onstitutional 
norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be le-
gally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of 
these limits should be understood as delineating only the boundaries of federal courts’ 
role in enforcing the norm.”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 190, 190 (1988) (claiming “‘prophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures 
of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law”); 
see also Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1061, 1140–46 
(2008) (reviewing literature on constitutional decision rules). 
27. Cf. infra Part IV.C (responding to concern that, over time, penalty sensitivity may 
undermine free speech protections). 
28. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (holding 
Second Amendment protects individual right to bear arms). 
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gests that there are similarly positive stories to tell about penalty-sensitive 
analysis and other constitutional liberties. 
I. WHAT IS PENALTY SENSITIVITY? 
What is penalty-sensitive free speech analysis? And how does it differ 
from other styles of constitutional review? These questions do not admit 
of easy answers, and this Article does not purport to offer a rigid classifi-
cation scheme. As with most attempts to create categories, dividing lines 
become hazy and contestable at the margins, sometimes making the 
presence of penalty sensitivity a matter of eye-of-the-beholder judgment. 
That said, some general guideposts may help to clarify what sorts of rul-
ings do—and do not—qualify as penalty-sensitive. 
First, penalty-sensitive free speech review is a method of implement-
ing the free speech right; it is not a method of applying other constitutional 
protections to cases that happen to involve expressive conduct. Penalty-
sensitive analysis derives punitive limits from the free speech right itself—
it does not derive these limits, at least exclusively, from the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause, the Due 
Process Clause (including its limits on punitive damages), or any other 
punishment-restricting norm within the Constitution. This is not to say 
that speech-related punishments could never violate Eighth Amendment 
or due process requirements. But were such a violation to occur (as 
would happen, for instance, if a trial court sentenced to death a juvenile 
purveyor of obscenity29), it would implicate Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality analysis, not penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis.30 
Penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis, by contrast, asks whether a 
restriction on speech violates the First Amendment in light of the severity 
of the punishment attached to it. 
 
29. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding Eighth Amendment 
prohibits application of death penalty to minors). 
30. That said, penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis need not ignore the pres-
ence of independent constitutional restrictions on punishment. Indeed, some readers 
might be inclined to view the enterprise as grounded in the joint application of the 
Constitution’s independent prohibitions on excessive punishment on the one hand, see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1052–61 
(2004) (comparing Court’s Eighth Amendment limits on criminal punishment with its 
due process limits on punitive damages); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due 
Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880, 883–
914 (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, Pricking the Lines] (similar), and its protection of the 
right to free speech on the other. My view is that the penalty-sensitive approach may be 
conceptualized as a freestanding method of First Amendment review, untethered to 
Eighth Amendment and due process doctrine. Whether this is so, however, is not a ques-
tion of great importance to this project. The important point is that penalty-sensitive re-
view involves analyzing the severity of a law’s penalties in connection with its impact on ex-
pressive conduct—not simply applying Eighth Amendment or Due Process analysis to laws 
that happen to regulate expressive activity. 
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Second, the term “penalty” in the phrase “penalty-sensitive analysis” 
encompasses a wide range of government actions. For purposes of this 
Article, government action is said to constitute a penalty as long as it in-
flicts some measure of harm on a speaker as a result of his speaking. 
Thus, the ensuing discussion does not confine itself to criminal punish-
ments; it also deals with other sorts of punitive measures, such as civil 
penalties, money damage awards, administrative enforcement actions, 
and the revocation or withholding of government-sponsored benefits. 
Some of these actions are more punitive than others, and some may ac-
complish both punitive and nonpunitive aims. (Civil damages awards, for 
example, compensate plaintiffs even as they burden defendants with the 
obligation to pay.) But an underlying assumption of this Article is that all 
of these actions share a common “penalizing” component—disadvantag-
ing a speaker for speaking—and that this shared component brings them 
under the same conceptual umbrella.31 
Third, penalty-sensitive review posits a positive correlation between 
the harshness of the governmental sanction and the strength of the 
speaker’s First Amendment claim. Laws should become more, not less, 
constitutionally problematic as their penalties increase in severity. Courts 
can recognize this correspondence in many different ways. They can ac-
cord dispositive effect to the severity of a speaker’s penalty, commanding 
that all penalties harsher than a baseline minimum automatically trigger 
a finding of First Amendment invalidity. Or they can treat the severity of 
the penalty as a softer variable, which functions as one of many factors 
weighing on the outcome of a case. Indeed, as Part IV further discusses, 
courts that promulgate penalty-sensitive doctrine can (and do) proceed 
down many different paths—relying on categorical penalty-based rules, 
semicategorical penalty-based presumptions, penalty-inclusive balancing 
tests, and other intermediate approaches. Whatever the path taken, the 
analysis counts as penalty-sensitive so long as rising levels in penalty sever-
ity correspond, even if roughly, to rising odds of a judicial finding of con-
stitutional invalidity.32 
 
31. This emphasis on penalties also illustrates how penalty-sensitive free speech analy-
sis differs from more traditional forms of time, place, and manner analysis: Time-place-
manner analysis addresses burdens that arise when individuals choose to comply with a 
speech restriction, while penalty-sensitive analysis addresses burdens that arise when indi-
viduals fail to comply. If a municipal ordinance prohibited the posting of signs on public 
property, see, e.g., Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
791 (1984), time-place-manner analysis would assume full compliance with the ordinance 
and then ask whether the individual’s inability to post signs in his yard unduly burdened 
his right to free expression. Penalty-sensitive analysis, by contrast, would expand the in-
quiry to include an assessment of the means by which the city punished defiant sign-
posters. The penalty-sensitive analyst might care, for example, about whether the city im-
posed particularly heavy fines on violators of the ordinance or whether the city ever im-
prisoned repeat offenders. 
32. Penalty-sensitive analysis is different from the sort of “proportionality analysis” 
that has recently attracted the attention of comparative constitutional scholars. Propor-
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Finally, penalty-sensitive free speech review concerns itself with the 
variable of severity. For a decision to qualify as penalty-sensitive, it cannot 
lean on just any penalty-related property; rather, the analysis must have 
something to do with the extent to which a penalty penalizes. This crite-
rion is less restrictive than it may initially seem. Penalty-sensitive doctrine 
need not explicitly compare “severe” against “not severe,” or “more se-
vere” against “less severe”; instead, it may (and often does) accomplish 
this comparison through the use of proxies. In Gertz, for example, the 
 
tionality analysis, broadly speaking, involves an explicit weighing of the benefits and harms 
created by constitutionally suspect laws, along with a case-by-case investigation into the 
closeness of fit between legitimate government aims and the means by which a law 
achieves them. See, e.g., David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law 159–76 (2004) (cata-
loguing examples of proportionality-oriented rights review, through which judges “assess 
the legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or ruling is before them from the perspective 
of those who reap its greatest benefits and those who stand to lose the most”); Aharon 
Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 L. & Ethics Hum. Rts. 1, 4 (2010) (de-
scribing proportionality analysis as “creat[ing] a conceptual framework in which to define 
the appropriate relationship between human rights and considerations that may justify 
their limitation”); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72, 73–74 (2008) (characterizing propor-
tionality analysis as “overarching principle of constitutional adjudication, the preferred 
procedure for managing disputes involving an alleged conflict between two rights claims, 
or between a rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest”). In this sense, it 
bears a close kinship to those areas of U.S. constitutional doctrine that eschew absolutist, 
category-oriented rules in favor of flexible, balancing-oriented standards. See, e.g., T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 944–45 
(1987) (describing “rise and spread of ‘balancing’ as a method of constitutional interpre-
tation” in America and offering several criticisms); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 381–98 (2009) 
(summarizing debates between proponents of balancing and categoricalism within First 
Amendment law); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?—A Reply to Professor 
Mendelson, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 729, 729–32 (1963) (contrasting balancing and absolutist ap-
proaches within U.S. constitutional doctrine); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the 
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 821, 821 (1962) (similar). See 
generally Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 Const. Comment. 
803, 832 (2004) (reviewing Beatty, supra) (noting “proportionality analysis shares certain 
characteristics of balancing approaches, as both may be distinguished from more categori-
cal or conceptual forms of analysis”). 
In a sense, penalty sensitivity may be attractive to proponents of proportionality analy-
sis, as it moves away from a rigid distinction between “punishable” and “unpunishable” 
speech and toward a more refined understanding of speech restrictions and the penalties 
they employ. But it is important not to overstate the connection here. As this Article later 
explains, penalty-sensitive rights review need not devolve into a case-by-case, “totality of the 
circumstances”-like weighing of government interests against liberty interests. That is cer-
tainly one way of putting penalty sensitivity to work. But penalty-sensitive doctrine may also 
assume a structure more reflective of categoricalism. (A penalty-sensitive rule might, for 
instance, divide speech-restricting penalties into a limited number of classifications and 
assign to each classification a precise rule of constitutional treatment.) Such an approach 
may be less categorical than certain penalty-neutral alternatives, but it may still qualify as 
categorical in an absolute sense. As a result, while proportionality analysis can certainly 
accommodate penalty-sensitive analysis, one may still accept the penalty-sensitive approach 
without abandoning rule-based categoricalism. 
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Court disallowed the recovery of punitive damages for certain types of li-
belous speech but in so doing did not grapple directly with the variable 
of penalty severity.33 Nevertheless, the Gertz rule qualifies as penalty-
sensitive because the in-kind distinction between compensatory and ex-
tracompensatory damages corresponds to an in-degree distinction be-
tween less severe and more severe penalties. (This is so because, all else 
equal, jury awards consisting of both actual damages and punitive dam-
ages will exceed awards limited to actual damages.) In short, penalty-
sensitive rules can rely on qualitative distinctions among types of penal-
ties, provided that these distinctions map onto quantitative distinctions in 
harshness. 
II. PENALTY SENSITIVITY IN OPERATION 
With penalty sensitivity’s definitional criteria in place, this Article 
now considers some real world illustrations of the practice. Part II.A 
identifies and describes six examples of penalty-sensitive free speech 
analysis. It also identifies three “red herrings”—rules and rulings in the 
First Amendment area that, though perhaps suggestive of the penalty-
sensitive approach, do not in fact manifest its hallmark traits. Part II.B 
then supplements the discussion with examples of penalty-sensitive re-
view from outside the free speech setting. Though not the central focus 
of this Article, this case law deserves attention, as it illustrates the range 
of doctrinal contexts in which penalty sensitivity has emerged and high-
lights the many different forms that such review might take. The ensuing 
discussion thus demonstrates that (a) penalty-sensitive review underlies a 
surprising number of free speech rules and rulings and (b) these rules 
and rulings are in keeping with many other areas of rights-related doc-
trine. These observations set the stage for the Article’s normative defense 
of penalty-sensitive free speech adjudication, which unfolds in Parts III 
and IV. 
A. Penalty Sensitivity and Free Speech Doctrine 
1. Seditious Libel and the Abrams Dissent. — At the center of the pan-
theon of great First Amendment writings stands Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
dissent in Abrams v. United States.34 Abrams and his colleagues had written 
and distributed leaflets encouraging strikes at ammunition factories in 
response to the U.S. government’s intervention in the Russian 
Revolution. The trial court had convicted them of violating the 1917 
Espionage Act, which prohibited, among other things, “urg[ing], in-
cit[ing] and advocat[ing] curtailment of production of things and prod-
ucts . . . necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.”35 Three 
 
33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). 
34. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 617 (majority opinion). 
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defendants received sentences of twenty years’ imprisonment, one de-
fendant received fifteen years, and a fifth defendant received three 
years.36 
Abrams marked a change of course for Holmes, who had earlier 
voted to uphold Espionage Act prosecutions in Schenck v. United States,37 
Frohwerk v. United States,38 and Debs v. United States.39 Why he shifted posi-
tions remains subject to debate,40 but one factor may have been the 
harshness of the penalties imposed on the Abrams defendants. Holmes 
had balked at the sentences in Schenck (six months),41 Frohwerk (ten 
years),42 and Debs (ten years),43 but he had voted to uphold them none-
theless.44 As Professor David Bogen has observed, however, “[t]he over-
 
36. Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and 
Free Speech 145–46 (1987); Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War I, and Repub-
lican Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 First Amendment L. Rev. 192, 234 
(2008). 
37. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
38. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
39. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
40. Scholars disagree as to whether Holmes’s reversal in Abrams was prompted by a 
material shift in his free speech philosophy, see, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: 
Free Speech in Wartime 198–211 (2004) (discussing Holmes’s correspondence with 
Learned Hand about Espionage Act cases and noting “Holmes had begun to rethink the 
issue of free speech” by time Abrams came before Court); Feldman, supra note 36, at 229–
44 (describing “transformation” of Holmes’s views on free expression during months pre-
ceding Abrams); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 734–44 (1975) 
(similar); G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Juris-
prudence: The Human Dimension, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 433–42 (1992) (similar), or 
whether Holmes had simply been “biding his time until the Court should have before it a 
conviction so clearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest thoughts about the First 
Amendment,” Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 86 (1942); see also 
Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 303, 335–50 (claiming Holmes’s views on free speech did not change between Schenck 
and Abrams). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 
762–63 (16th ed. 2007) (summarizing debate). 
41. Polenberg, supra note 36, at 212–13. Schenck’s accomplice, Dr. Elizabeth Baer, 
received a sentence of ninety days. Id. 
42. 249 U.S. at 206. 
43. 249 U.S. at 212. 
44. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 27, 
1919), in 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Homes and Sir 
Frederick Pollock 1874–1932, at 11 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (“Now I hope the 
President will pardon [Debs] and some other poor devils with whom I have more sympa-
thy.”); see also David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Justice Holmes, 11 
Hofstra L. Rev. 97, 183 (1983) (noting “Holmes had been upset by the prosecutions in the 
earlier cases and stated to his friends that the sentences there should be sharply reduced 
and commuted by the President”). Holmes’s feelings on this score were by no means 
unique to him. As a roughly contemporaneous account of the cases explained, “[m]uch of 
the bitter feeling which these cases have engendered in the United States is due to the 
manner in which the trials were conducted . . . and to the length of the sentences.” Notes, 42 
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reaction of the judges and juries that . . . [Holmes had] perceived in . . . 
[Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs] was mild compared to the fervor exhibited 
against the Abrams defendants in sentencing them to a twenty-year im-
prisonment.”45 What is more, whereas “Debs and Frohwerk addressed 
significant sympathetic groups and Schenck addressed his message to 
persons who might respond from self-interest,”46 the Abrams defendants 
were, as Zechariah Chafee would later describe them, “five obscure and 
isolated youngsters . . . who hatched their wild scheme in a garret and 
carried it out in a cellar.”47 In short, the punishments at issue in Abrams—
far more so than the punishments at issue in its predecessor cases—were 
strikingly disproportionate to the defendants’ underlying crimes. 
The heaviness of these sanctions did not escape Holmes’s notice, 
and his dissent in Abrams drew attention to their severity. Early in his 
opinion, Holmes had speculated that the First Amendment might not 
prohibit the government from prosecuting attempts to disrupt the pro-
duction of wartime goods, provided that the government could show that 
a defendant specifically intended to achieve that result.48 Holmes con-
cluded that the government had not proven specific intent in this case, 
but his analysis did not stop there. He explained, 
In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been 
imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the de-
fendants had as much right to publish as the Government has to 
publish the Constitution of the United States now vainly in-
voked by them. Even if I am technically wrong and enough can 
be squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn the 
color of legal litmus paper; I will add, even if what I think the nec-
essary intent were shown; the most nominal punishment seems to me all 
that possibly could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be 
made to suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the 
creed that they avow . . . .49 
In other words, even if Abrams and his collaborators had specifically 
intended to curtail wartime production (and thereby surrendered their 
right to absolute constitutional protection), the First Amendment would 
 
L.Q. Rev. 1, 14 (1926) (emphasis added). 
45. Bogen, supra note 44, at 183. 
46. Id. at 182. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America at 
the time of his prosecution. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919). Eugene Debs 
was a founding member of the Industrial Workers of the World and frequent presidential 
candidate for the Socialist Party of America. See Kermit L. Hall & John J. Patrick, The 
Pursuit of Justice: Supreme Court Decisions that Shaped America 78–79 (2006); Novick, 
supra note 40, at 341. 
47. Zechariah Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial—The United States Versus Jacob 
Abrams et al., 33 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 773 (1920); see also Bogen, supra note 44, at 182 
(“Abrams and his codefendants scattered to the winds a message, in a foreign language, 
that no one had a personal interest in accepting.”). 
48. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 629 (emphasis added). 
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still have prohibited the trial court from imposing a twenty-year sentence. 
Indeed, for Holmes, only “the most nominal punishment” would have 
passed constitutional muster.50 
The critical point is not hard to see. As Thomas Reed Powell later 
explained, Holmes’s dissent put forth “the suggestion that the First 
Amendment limits the degree of punishment for speech concededly 
punishable.”51 Many years later, David Currie offered the same 
interpretation, crediting this passage with the “the novel and interesting 
notion that the first amendment . . . limited the punishment that could 
be imposed even for speech not wholly protected.”52 
2. Defamation. — Penalty sensitivity was limited to a dissenting opin-
ion in Abrams, but it later made its way into several majority opinions—
and hence, operative First Amendment law. A good example comes from 
the defamation context. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.53 followed in the after-
math of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the first Supreme Court case to 
recognize First Amendment limits on state court defamation judg-
ments.54 In New York Times, the Court held that a “public official” could 
not “recover[] damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual mal-
ice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”55 In so holding, the Court left many ques-
 
50. Id. Holmes’s Abrams dissent, moreover, does not present the only example of 
penalty-sensitive musings from this era. Whitney v. California, decided eight years after 
Abrams, involved a prosecution under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act. 274 U.S. 357 
(1927). The Court unanimously rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenges, but 
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, concurred separately, expressing concern with 
the majority’s analysis of the free speech claim. Brandeis argued for strict application of 
the “clear and present danger” test, which would limit the government’s power to regulate 
seditious libel to situations in which “immediate serious violence was to be expected or was 
advocated, or . . . [where] the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy 
was then contemplated.” Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). But the opinion also ap-
peared to endorse Holmes’s earlier suggestion that the clear and present danger test 
should apply in a penalty-sensitive manner. Specifically, Brandeis noted that “[a] police 
measure may be unconstitutional merely because the remedy, although effective as means 
of protection, is unduly harsh or oppressive,” id. at 377, and that, while the state could cer-
tainly criminalize trespass, “it is hardly conceivable that this Court would hold constitu-
tional a statute which punished as a felony the mere voluntary assembly with a society 
formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste 
lands and to advocate their doing so,” id. at 378 (emphasis added).  
51. Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919–1920 (pt. 3), 19 Mich. L. Rev. 
283, 292 (1920). Powell went on to wonder whether “Mr. Justice Holmes has the due-
process clause of the Fifth Amendment in mind.” Id. 
52. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910–1921, 1985 Duke 
L.J. 1111, 1154–55 n.225. 
53. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
54. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding “the Constitution delimits a State’s power to 
award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official 
conduct”). 
55. Id. at 279–80. 
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tions unanswered, one of which was whether the “actual malice” rule ap-
plied to plaintiffs other than public officials. A subsequent decision, 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, extended the rule to cover defamatory 
speech about “public figures.”56 Gertz presented the question whether the 
rule should also apply to defamatory speech about “private citizens” 
caught up in “public issues.”57 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., decided prior to Gertz, had posed the 
same question, but there a fractured Court failed to answer it.58 The 
Rosenbloom plurality favored furnishing full New York Times protection to 
“all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general 
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or 
anonymous.”59 But other Justices put differing options on the table. Of 
particular note, Justices Marshall and Harlan, in separate dissents, out-
lined approaches that would have (a) relaxed the “actual malice” re-
quirement for defamation actions brought by private-figure plaintiffs but 
(b) limited the amount of damages that private-figure plaintiffs could re-
cover.60 As for how to implement this second part of the plan, the two 
Justices had different ideas. Marshall favored permitting damages for “ac-
tual” injury but forbidding presumed and punitive damages across the 
board.61 Harlan, in contrast, would have permitted punitive damages but 
only when “actual malice” was shown and the damages bore “a reason-
able and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done.”62 Notwith-
standing these disagreements as to details, both Justices thus endorsed a 
penalty-sensitive rule. 
Three years later, revisiting the issue left open by Rosenbloom, the 
Gertz majority built on Marshall’s and Harlan’s earlier proposals. The 
Court held (a) that private citizens could recover damages for negli-
gently published defamatory falsehoods, but they could not recover any-
thing beyond compensation for actual injury and (b) that presumed and 
punitive damages were off limits, unless the plaintiffs could satisfy the 
 
56. 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result); see also Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 336 (noting “[a]lthough Mr. Justice Harlan announced the result in [Butts], a ma-
jority of the Court agreed with Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of ‘public figures’ as well as ‘public officials’”). 
57. 418 U.S. at 325 (considering “the extent of a publisher’s constitutional privilege 
against liability for defamation of a private citizen”). 
58. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
59. Id. at 44 (plurality opinion). 
60. See id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating approach that would “restrict 
damages to actual losses”); id. at 77 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I would hold unconstitu-
tional, in a private libel case, jury authority to award punitive damages which is unconfined 
by the requirement that these awards bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the 
actual harm done.”). 
61. See id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The threats to society’s interest in free-
dom of the press that are involved in punitive and presumed damages can largely be 
eliminated by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual injuries.”). 
62. Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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strict actual-malice standard set forth in New York Times.63 Writing for the 
majority in Gertz, Justice Powell defended this rule in penalty-sensitive 
terms.64 He reaffirmed the Court’s recognition of the “legitimate state in-
terest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation,” but 
he also stipulated that “this countervailing state interest extends no fur-
ther than compensation for actual injury.”65 Anything beyond this, he 
reasoned, would pose a special threat to free expression. With presumed 
damages, juries could award “substantial sums as compensation for sup-
posed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually 
occurred.”66 This in turn would “compound[] the potential of any system 
of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms.”67 And with punitive damages, “jury discre-
tion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they 
not be excessive.”68 Consequently, juries could award these damages “in 
wholly unpredictable amounts,” which could “unnecessarily exacerbat[e] 
the danger of media self-censorship.”69 
The bottom line for the Gertz majority was that neither presumed 
nor punitive damages substantially furthered the state’s interest in com-
pensating injury and both types of damages threatened unpopular ex-
pression with severe forms of punishment. Hence the need for a penalty-
sensitive rule—that is, a rule that could accommodate the state’s interest 
in making victims whole, while staving off the specter of sky-high damage 
awards.70 The penalty-sensitive nature of the rule is thus apparent. The 
Court in Gertz did not limit the state’s power to impose liability; it did, 
however, limit the amount of damages that the state could attach to this 
liability. And although the scope of the rule has been refined in later 
cases,71 its penalty-sensitive framework remains firmly intact. When the 
rule applies, speech may be penalized but only to a limited degree.72 
 
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“[A] private defamation 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New 
York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual 
injury.”). 
64. Id. at 343. 
65. Id. at 348–49. 
66. Id. at 349; see also T. Michael Mather, Experience With Gertz “Actual Injury” in 
Defamation Cases, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 917, 949 (1986) (noting “presumed damage cases 
have substantially higher compensatory damage awards on average than actual injury 
compensatory damage awards”). 
67. 418 U.S. at 349. 
68. Id. at 350. 
69. Id. 
70. Whether the Gertz rule achieved its objective of reducing damage awards is not 
altogether clear. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone : A Study in Constitu-
tional Policy-Making, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 645, 669–72 (1977) (arguing Gertz rule still allows 
exorbitant damages awards). 
71. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761–62 
(1985) (holding Gertz inapplicable when speech at issue does not involve “a matter of pub-
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3. Public Employment. — Penalty sensitivity has also materialized 
within case law involving the speech of public employees. The penalties 
at issue here take the form of disciplinary measures that supervisors di-
rect at their subordinates. These measures vary greatly in their harshness: 
At one end of the spectrum, disciplinary action might entail nothing 
more than a verbal reprimand; at the other, it can amount to outright 
dismissal. Given this wide range of severity levels, one might expect the 
character of an employer’s disciplinary action to figure prominently in 
judicial analysis of public employees’ free speech claims. It would not be 
implausible, for example, to draw a constitutional distinction between 
cases in which employers punish speech with short suspensions and cases 
in which employers punish the same speech with outright termination. 
For a number of years, some lower courts assumed as much, inter-
preting Supreme Court case law to mean that free speech violations were 
more likely to occur when the government fired its employees for speech-
related reasons.73 But in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, the Court jet-
tisoned this approach.74 Rutan involved a claim by Illinois civil service em-
ployees that their professional situations had suffered on account of their 
political affiliation. Notably, none of these employees had been fired; 
rather, they had suffered such lesser harms as promotion denials and 
targeted exclusions from post-layoff recall appointments. 
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the case by asking whether these em-
ployment actions amounted to the “substantial equivalent of a dis-
missal.”75 This approach seemed reasonable under then-existing prece-
 
lic concern”). 
72. Given the penalty-sensitive nature of the Gertz decision, it is perhaps surprising 
that the Court has not drawn a similar constitutional distinction between civil and criminal 
libel laws, subjecting the latter to something even more restrictive than the New York Times 
standard. Cf. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
Yale L.J. 877, 924 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, Toward a General Theory] (arguing 
criminal libel laws should be deemed unconstitutional, in part because “in the context of a 
public prosecution the dangers in punishing expression under the necessarily loose stan-
dards invoked are . . . great” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, the Court had an opportunity to 
draw just such a penalty-sensitive distinction in a companion case to New York Times, 
Garrison v. Louisiana, but it instead chose to apply the same standard to both types of re-
strictions, without suggesting that governments might enjoy less constitutional leeway 
when regulating defamation through criminal means. 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964). In New York 
Times, the Court explained, 
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute 
is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards 
under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly 
more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (footnote omitted). 
73. See, e.g., Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623–24 (4th Cir. 1980) (confin-
ing inquiry to dismissal of employee and employment practices “that can be determined to 
be the substantial equivalent of dismissal”). 
74. 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990). 
75. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 956 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), 
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dent,76 but the Supreme Court rejected it in no uncertain terms. 
Whether or not substantially equivalent to dismissals, Justice Brennan 
declared for the majority, the actions represented “significant penalties” 
that “impermissibly encroach[ed] on First Amendment freedoms.” 77 He 
continued, 
We . . . determine that promotions, transfers, and recalls after 
layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermis-
sible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public 
employees. In doing so, we reject the Seventh Circuit’s view of 
the appropriate constitutional standard by which to measure al-
leged patronage practices in government employment. The 
Seventh Circuit proposed that only those employment decisions 
that are the “substantial equivalent of a dismissal” violate a pub-
lic employee’s rights under the First Amendment. We find this 
test unduly restrictive because it fails to recognize that there are 
deprivations less harsh than dismissal that nevertheless press 
state employees and applicants to conform their beliefs and as-
sociations to some state-selected orthodoxy.78 
Indeed, Justice Brennan went further, proclaiming that “the First 
Amendment . . . protects state employees from ‘even an act of retaliation 
as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . 
when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech rights.’”79 
On his view, any form of retaliation, no matter how minimal, would seem 
to violate the First Amendment. His stance was avowedly penalty-neutral. 
Yet even the far-reaching rhetoric of Rutan has not erased penalty 
sensitivity from the public employment picture. With the discharge/ 
nondischarge distinction now a thing of the past, some lower courts, re-
luctant to follow Rutan to its logical conclusion, have developed a differ-
ent set of punishment-based boundaries. Dismissing the “birthday party” 
language as “colorful dicta,”80 these courts have declared that not every 
form of speech-based retaliation can violate an employee’s free speech 
rights. Instead, they have held that a First Amendment violation cannot 
materialize unless the employer has taken an “adverse employment ac-
tion” against the employee-speaker.81 In so doing, they have drawn from 
 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 497 U.S. 62. 
76. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (holding employee may not 
be discharged solely on basis of political beliefs); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) 
(holding patronage dismissals due to political affiliation violated First Amendment). 
77. 497 U.S. at 74–75. 
78. Id. at 75 (citing 868 F.2d at 954–57). 
79. Id. at 75 n.8 (quoting 868 F.2d at 954 n.4). 
80. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of Ed., 232 F.3d 1334, 1340 
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting “[a]lthough . . . employers’ acts short of dismissal may be action-
able as First Amendment violations, we have never ruled that all such acts, no matter how 
trivial, are sufficient to support a retaliation claim”). 
81. See, e.g., id.; Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (arguing “[i]t 
would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of 
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the Supreme Court’s Title VII precedents, which make clear that an “ad-
verse employment action” requirement envisions “materially adverse” ac-
tion, thereby “separat[ing] significant from trivial harms.”82 These courts, 
in other words, have not abandoned penalty sensitivity in Rutan’s wake. 
Rather, they have simply lowered the penalty-sensitive threshold—replac-
ing the old discharge/nondischarge distinction with a new distinction 
between materially and nonmaterially adverse employment actions. 
The new threshold is more demanding than might first meet the 
eye. Consider the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lybrook v. Members of 
Farmington Municipal School Board of Education.83 The court there rejected 
the First Amendment claim of a school teacher whose supervisors had 
placed her on a “Professional Development Plan” and required her to at-
tend weekly one-on-one meetings with the principal.84 Lybrook lost her 
case, but not because the court deemed her speech unworthy of protec-
tion. Rather, her problem lay in her penalty—a penalty that, in the 
court’s view, did not rise to the level of an “adverse or detrimental em-
ployment decision.”85 In particular, “while the Professional Development 
Plan and the Monday morning meetings may have been unwelcome[] to 
her,” Lybrook’s punishment was “of insufficient gravity to premise a First 
Amendment violation.”86 
Lybrook’s penalty was hardly the stuff of Hammurabi’s Code; one 
can imagine fates far worse than participating in professionalism training 
and meeting weekly with the principal. But it was a penalty all the same. 
The school made Lybrook do things she did not want to do, and it took 
this action because Lybrook had engaged in a form of expressive con-
duct. What drove the Lybrook analysis, then, was not a conclusion regard-
ing the value of Lybrook’s speech, but the fact that the state’s chosen 
means of punishment was an especially lenient one. For this reason, the 
Lybrook decision and the adverse action rule it reflects qualify as penalty-
sensitive. 
4. Vagueness/Overbreadth. — The doctrines discussed in the preceding 
pages draw substantive boundaries between types of speech. The vague-
ness and overbreadth doctrines, by contrast, impose procedural limits on 
lawmakers’ ability to propound restrictions on speech. Vagueness rules 
 
free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from that exercise”); Pierce v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 
n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining Fifth Circuit has “require[d] more than a trivial act to es-
tablish constitutional harm”). 
82. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
83. 232 F.3d at 1334. 
84. Id. at 1337. The plan required Lybrook “to ‘[s]trive to create an atmosphere that 
will nurture collaboration with all colleagues’” and “‘to conduct affairs with a conscious 
concern for the highest standards of professional commitment.’” Id. 
85. Id. at 1339. 
86. Id. at 1341. 
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permit facial invalidation of laws that set forth imprecise standards of le-
gality, while overbreadth rules permit facial invalidations of laws that re-
strict both protected and unprotected forms of expression.87 A brief look 
at both doctrines reveals further examples of penalty-sensitive review. 
Reflecting penalty sensitivity within First Amendment vagueness doc-
trine is the Court’s “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather 
than criminal penalties.”88 This “greater tolerance” arises from the fact 
that “the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe” in the 
civil context (where punishments generally involve nothing worse than 
monetary fines),89 than in the criminal context (where punishments can 
entail lengthy prison sentences, and where the collateral effects of prose-
cution and conviction are of the highest order).90 
Consistent with this notion is the Court’s decision in NEA v. Finley.91 
This case presented the question whether Congress violated First 
Amendment vagueness rules when it instructed officials at the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to “tak[e] into consideration general 
standards of decency” when evaluating grant applications.92 The Ninth 
 
87. Though rooted in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process guaran-
tees, void-for-vagueness review is traditionally understood to furnish a special sort of pro-
tection to First Amendment rights. This is because the Court has long adhered to the rule 
that “[w]here a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is 
capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands 
a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 
(1974); see also Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (“The vice of 
unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question 
operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the 
Constitution.”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (“[T]his Court has intimated 
that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having 
a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril 
here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.”). 
88. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982). 
89. Id. at 499. 
90. See id.; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (observing “it would be unthinkable to convict a man for violating a law he could not 
understand”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (“The standards of certainty 
in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil 
sanction for enforcement.”); see also Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2009) (noting “courts must take extra care in determining whether criminal statutes are 
vague”); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 Geo. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2005) (observing criminal sanction “may impose a social 
stigma that permanently impairs the defendant’s quality of life in a manner rarely equaled 
by a civil judgment”); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling 
the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 697 (1978) (“The possibility of imprisonment 
coupled with the stigma and disabilities which accompany a criminal conviction will most 
often lead an individual to view the criminal penalty as more harmful than a civil sanc-
tion.”). 
91. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
92. Id. 
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Circuit answered in the affirmative, characterizing the standard as “not 
susceptible to objective definition” and thus highly vulnerable “to the 
danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”93 The Supreme 
Court reversed. While never rejecting the lower court’s characterization 
of the statutory language as deeply indeterminate, the Court explained 
that the Ninth Circuit had applied an unduly stringent standard of preci-
sion. As Justice O’Connor explained, “[t]he terms of the provision are 
undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute or regula-
tory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness concerns.”94 This 
case, however, did not involve a “criminal statute or regulatory scheme,” 
and so “the consequences of imprecision [we]re not constitutionally se-
vere.”95 
Several considerations supported the majority’s position, including, 
for example, the voluntariness of the artists’ decision to submit them-
selves to the guidelines, the inherent subjectivity of artistic judgments, 
and the inadvisability of second guessing the NEA’s (and Congress’s) 
chosen standards. In addition to these points, however, Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that, given the “penalties” attached to the law, “[i]t is 
unlikely . . . that speakers will be compelled to steer too far clear of any 
‘forbidden area’ in the context of grants of this nature.”96 This argument 
makes sense only in penalty-sensitive terms. Grant applicants are less 
likely to “steer far clear of any forbidden area” because the consequence 
of entering the area—i.e., the penalty imposed on the speaker—is merely 
the disappointment of not winning the grant. By contrast, the subjects of 
an equally vague criminal regulation, faced with the prospect of fines or 
even terms in prison, would be sure to err on the side of caution. 
Similar thinking drove Justice Kennedy’s overbreadth analysis in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.97 The Child Pornography Protection Act 
(CPPA) criminalized the possession and distribution of images that ap-
peared to depict—but in fact did not depict—minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.98 The government defended the Act as a constitution-
ally permissible restriction of child pornography under New York v. 
Ferber99 and, in the alternative, a constitutionally permissible restriction of 
obscenity under Miller v. California.100 The Court, however, rejected both 
contentions, deeming Ferber inapplicable to “virtual” child pornogra-
 
93. Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 524 U.S. 569. 
94. 524 U.S. at 588. 
95. Id at 588–89. 
96. Id. at 588. 
97. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
98. Id. at 239. 
99. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding child pornography not generally entitled to First 
Amendment protection). 
100. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing guidelines for defining obscenity). 
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phy,101 and finding only a small portion of the speech criminalized by the 
CPPA to qualify as obscene under Miller.102 This left open the question 
whether the Court should invalidate the CPPA on its face, or only as ap-
plied to speech not punishable under Miller. 
Opting for facial invalidation, Justice Kennedy stressed the severity 
of the CPPA’s penalties: 
The CPPA’s penalties are indeed severe. A first offender may be 
imprisoned for 15 years. A repeat offender faces a prison sen-
tence of not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years in 
prison. While even minor punishments can chill protected 
speech, this case provides a textbook example of why we permit 
facial challenges to statutes that burden expression. With these 
severe penalties in force, few legitimate movie producers or 
book publishers, or few other speakers in any capacity, would 
risk distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this 
law.103 
Accordingly, the Court struck down the CPPA in its entirety, point-
ing not just to the overbreadth of its coverage, but also to what might be 
fairly called the “overdepth” of the penalties imposed.104 
5. Indecency. — An additional area of penalty-sensitive doctrine in-
volves “indecent” expression and the communications media. The key 
case is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.105 A New York radio station had broad-
cast George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” monologue during a weekday 
afternoon, thereby prompting an angry listener to complain to the 
FCC.106 The FCC responded by issuing a declaratory order, which clari-
fied that, but for the good graces of the agency, the station’s broadcast 
“could have been the subject of administrative sanctions,” and warned 
that “in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the 
Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the avail-
able sanctions it has been granted by Congress.”107 The station owner 
challenged the order, claiming that it violated the station’s free speech 
rights. The Court found in favor of the FCC. 
 
101. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249–51. 
102. Id. at 246–49. 
103. Id. at 244 (citations omitted). 
104. Interestingly, Justice O’Connor, who had earlier recognized a penalty-based dis-
tinction in Finley, refused to go along with Kennedy’s overbreadth analysis, and left unad-
dressed his claims about the CPPA’s punishments. Id. at 265–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
105. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
106. The letter, incidentally, utilized four of the seven words but only for the purpose 
of recounting the content of Carlin’s monologue. Angela J. Campbell, Pacifica Reconsid-
ered: Implications for the Current Controversy over Broadcast Indecency, 63 Fed. Comm. 
L.J. 195, 201–02 (2010) (reproducing letter). 
107. 438 U.S. at 730. 
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The Court’s analysis in Pacifica was fact-specific. In a section of the 
opinion agreed to by a majority of the Court, Justice Stevens emphasized 
the “narrowness” of the holding—pointing out, for example, that the 
Court had not decided whether the FCC could apply similar indecency 
standards to “a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a 
dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy.”108 Of particular im-
portance, the Carlin monologue teemed with profanities; thus, Pacifica 
did not address whether the FCC could sanction a broadcast in which 
expletives made only a passing appearance.109 In addition, the broadcast 
had aired at an hour when children were likely to be tuned in; thus, the 
Court did not consider whether the FCC could target equally profane 
broadcasts that aired late at night.110 
All of these factors played a role in the Court’s analysis in Pacifica. 
But another factor mattered, too: As the Court explained, the penalty at 
issue was nothing more than a shot across the bow. The FCC had asserted 
the authority to impose sanctions, but it had not exercised that authority 
directly. Accordingly, the Court declined to decide whether “an occa-
sional expletive [in different settings] would justify any sanction, or, in-
deed, [whether] this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.”111 
The Court elaborated no further on this point, but its message was clear: 
The government’s power to punish indecency on the airwaves was not 
unlimited. Criminal punishments would bear a higher constitutional 
burden, and so too might harsher civil sanctions.112 Indeed, at least two 
lower court cases later read the case in just this way. In Carlin 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Second Circuit relied on Pacifica’s 
“criminal prosecution” language to hold that a criminal statute would be 
 
108. Id. at 750. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. This qualification may have been included to help bring the Pacifica holding 
in line with the Court’s earlier assertion—in Cohen v. California—that “the State may not, 
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public dis-
play . . . of [profanity] a criminal offense.” 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emphasis added). As 
Justice Stevens explained, “It should be noted that the Commission imposed a far more 
moderate penalty on Pacifica than the state court imposed on Cohen. Even the strongest 
civil penalty at the Commission’s command does not include criminal prosecution.” 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25.  
112. In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), decided one year prior to Pacifica, 
Justice Stevens had pushed for a similar approach to the regulation of obscenity. Dissent-
ing from the majority’s opinion in that case, Justice Stevens argued that criminal and civil 
obscenity laws should trigger application of different constitutional standards, noting in 
particular that 
[a]lthough the variable nature of a standard dependent on local community atti-
tudes is critically defective when used to define a federal crime, that very flexibil-
ity is a desirable feature of a civil rule designed to protect the individual’s right 
to select the kind of environment in which he wants to live. 
Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutional if its prohibitions were construed to encompass the 
transmission of indecent material.113 And in Community Television of Utah, 
Inc. v. Wilkinson, a federal district court interpreted the same passage to 
mean that “[i]f the penalty [in Pacifica] had been greater the result in 
the case may have been different.”114 
The Court reaffirmed the penalty-sensitive aspects of its Pacifica rul-
ing in Reno v. ACLU.115 There, the Court passed judgment on the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which criminalized the online 
transmission of obscene and indecent materials to minors. Arguing 
against invalidation, the government relied on Pacifica, noting that there 
the Court had withheld constitutional protection from indecent speech. 
The Court, however, rejected this analysis, concluding that a close look at 
Pacifica “raises—rather than relieves—doubts concerning the constitu-
tionality of the CDA.”116 In particular, among the “significant differences 
between the order upheld in Pacifica and the CDA” was one related to 
penalties: Unlike the CDA, which called for punishments of up to two 
years in prison, the “declaratory order [in Pacifica] was not punitive.”117 
This difference was significant, the Court explained, because in Pacifica it 
had “expressly refused to decide whether the indecent broadcast ‘would 
justify a criminal prosecution.’”118 
6. School Speech. — One further example of penalty-sensitive free 
speech review comes from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Bethel School 
District v. Fraser.119 Bethel asked whether the First Amendment permitted a 
public high school to suspend a student for delivering an on-campus 
speech rife with sexual double entendres. The Ninth Circuit had an-
swered this question in the negative, holding that the Court’s earlier de-
cision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District120 pro-
hibited the school from disciplining the speaker, Matthew Fraser, in any 
way at all.121 The Supreme Court reversed, with a majority of the Justices 
asserting that the “School District acted entirely within its permissible 
authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser.”122 Thus, while reaching op-
 
113. 837 F.2d 546, 560 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Pacifica did not decide that the indecent 
broadcast ‘would justify a criminal prosecution.’ Here the statute specifically authorizes 
prosecution. Were the term ‘indecent’ to be given meaning other than Miller obscenity, we 
believe the statute would be unconstitutional.” (quoting 438 U.S. at 750)). 
114. 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1111 (D. Utah 1985). 
115. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
116. Id. at 864. 
117. Id. at 867. 
118. Id. (quoting 438 U.S. at 750). 
119. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
120. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
121. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding 
“the First Amendment prohibited the District from punishing Fraser”), rev’d, 478 U.S. 
675. 
122. 478 U.S. at 685. 
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posite results, the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court majority at least 
seemed to agree that the nature of the punishment inflicted on Fraser 
was not relevant to his First Amendment claim. 
In contrast, Justice Brennan suggested in an opinion concurring in 
the judgment that a school’s chosen means of disciplinary action should 
not lie outside the First Amendment inquiry. Like the majority, Brennan 
believed that “school officials did not violate the First Amendment in de-
termining that [Fraser] should be disciplined.”123 But unlike the major-
ity, he harbored doubts about the gravity of Fraser’s punishment: 
Respondent served two days’ suspension and had his name re-
moved from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the 
school’s commencement exercises, although he was eventually 
permitted to speak at the graduation. While I find this punish-
ment somewhat severe in light of the nature of respondent’s 
transgression, I cannot conclude that school officials exceeded 
the bounds of their disciplinary authority.124 
Thus, although he did not conclude that Fraser’s punishment was 
unduly harsh in this case, Justice Brennan’s ruminations left open the 
possibility that a harsher punishment might have met a different consti-
tutional fate.125 
7. Three Red Herrings. — This subsection turns briefly to three areas 
of doctrine that, while showing some signs of the penalty-sensitive ap-
 
123. Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
124. Id. at 690 n.3. For a survey of recent lower court cases exploring the possibility 
of punishment-based review of school speech claims, see James F. Ianelli, Note, Punish-
ment and Student Speech: Straining the Reach of the First Amendment, 33 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 885, 890–92 (2010) (outlining and critiquing approach).  
125. For some of the examples discussed in this Part, it is a fair question whether 
penalty-sensitive considerations—though expressly entertained by the Court—actually af-
fected the outcome of the cases being decided. “Come on,” a skeptic might say, “the sever-
ity of the penalty didn’t really matter in cases like Pacifica, Finley, or Free Speech Coalition. The 
Court just employed penalty-sensitive reasoning for rhetorical effect; the penalty-sensitive 
aspects of these holdings amount to nothing more than window dressing applied to cases 
that were penalty-neutral at their core.” 
As a descriptive observation, this claim may have some merit. But even assuming its 
rightness, the point does not much matter. Whatever the Court’s motivations for discuss-
ing the severity of a speaker’s penalty, two things are clear: First, the Court’s use of penalty-
sensitive reasoning for rhetorical effect would itself be significant; it would tell us that 
penalty-sensitive reasoning carries rhetorical purchase, and hence some innate appeal, at 
least to members of the Supreme Court. Second, and more important, if penalty-sensitive 
arguments find support in the Court’s precedents, those arguments are fair game for liti-
gants and judges to cite in future cases, whatever the realist origins for those precedents 
might be. Yesterday’s window dressing can inspire tomorrow’s redesign; throwaway lan-
guage in one decision can become the doctrinal linchpin of another. If penalty-sensitive 
language appears within prior free speech precedents, then readers of such precedents 
may take this language at face value. Penalty sensitivity, in other words, may not explain the 
true basis for all of the decisions discussed above, but once invoked, it belongs to First 
Amendment law. And that fact, in itself, must matter to anyone who desires to understand 
this law in full. 
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proach, do not quite embody the mode of free speech review that this 
Article addresses. The primary aim here is to sharpen definitional con-
tours. Having identified illustrations of what falls within the boundaries 
of the penalty-sensitive approach, the Article will briefly identify some 
examples that fall outside these boundaries. 
a. Prior Restraints. — Under the prior restraint rule, governments 
enjoy greater constitutional leeway to regulate speech through 
postpublication prosecutions than through prepublication restraint 
orders.126 Does this rule count as penalty-sensitive? Initial indicators are 
positive: The rule draws distinctions based on the government’s means of 
enforcing speech restrictions, and these means of enforcement employ 
different types of punishments (e.g., contempt citations on the one hand 
and traditional criminal/civil sanctions on the other). As a result, the 
rule creates categories of speech that are punishable, but only in certain 
ways. 
Given the criteria identified in Part I, however, the prior restraint 
rule counts as penalty-sensitive only if the in-kind distinction between 
prior restraints and subsequent punishments tracks an in-degree distinc-
tion between “more exacting” and “less exacting” punishments. Here, 
such a showing cannot be made, since, as Professor Marin Scordato has 
noted, “there is no apparent logical or practically necessary correlation 
between the severity of the sanction imposed in response to a violation of 
the law and the law’s status as either a prior restraint or a subsequent 
sanction.”127 Indeed, postpublication punishments often are draconian; 
just ask Jacob Abrams, who faced twenty years’ imprisonment based on a 
postpublication prosecution. Prior restraints in the form of injunction 
decrees, by contrast, are often quite limited.128 Consequently, scholarly 
 
126. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“The thread running 
through [many First Amendment] cases is that prior restraints on speech and publication 
are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”). 
For examples of decisions disfavoring prior restraint, see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (finding government had not met 
“heavy burden” necessary to justify prior restraint on publication of Pentagon Papers); 
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding government “carries a 
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint”); Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expres-
sion comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (noting “chief purpose [of First Amendment 
is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). 
127. Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (1989). But see John E. Nowak & Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.16(e), at 1305–06 (8th ed. 2010) (speculating that 
courts may tend to punish prior restraint violations more harshly because “[c]ourts are 
more adamant in punishing contempt of their orders than . . . criminal statutes,” in which 
they have no “personal stake”). 
128. See Blasi, supra note 16, at 27 (“[S]anctions for the violation of injunctions and 
permit ordinances tend to be light in comparison with those commonly administered un-
der the subsequent punishment regimes.”). 
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discussion of the prior restraint rule has centered on dangers unrelated 
to the degree of punishment: for example, the relative lack of procedural 
protections in the prior restraint context,129 the increased probability of 
speech suppression through prior restraints,130 and the tendency of prior 
restraint proceedings to present free speech claims in the abstract, rather 
than in the light of a fully developed record.131 These accounts may pro-
vide a satisfactory explanation of the elevated judicial scrutiny of prior 
restraints, but they have nothing to do with differences in penalty sever-
ity. 
b. Unconstitutional Conditions. — Running through First Amendment 
law—and constitutional rights review more generally—is the problem of 
unconstitutional conditions. This problem arises whenever the 
government conditions receipt of a public benefit—be it a government 
salary, welfare assistance, a procurement contract, and so on—on the 
recipient’s waiver of certain constitutional protections. The law in this 
area is complicated and multifaceted, but it is generally understood that, 
within First Amendment doctrine, the government may more freely 
regulate speech through the conditional allocation of benefits than 
through the direct imposition of criminal and civil sanctions.132 To the 
extent that such a principle governs First Amendment law, it might be 
tempting to regard it as embodying the penalty-sensitive approach.133 
Unconstitutional conditions doctrine sometimes permits the imposition 
 
129. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 648, 657 (1955) [hereinafter Emerson, Prior Restraint] (noting “the procedural 
protections built around criminal prosecution—many of which are constitutional guaran-
tees—are not applicable to a prior restraint”); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the 
Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 55 (1984) (observ-
ing that prior restraint schemes present “the threat that expression will be abridged, if 
only for a short time, prior to a full and fair hearing before an independent judicial fo-
rum”). 
130. See Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 129, at 657 (noting “a decision to sup-
press in advance is usually more readily reached, on the same facts, than a decision to pun-
ish after the event”). 
131. See Blasi, supra note 16, at 49 (noting prior restraints typically involve “adjudica-
tion in the abstract,” under which “the final authoritative judicial decision regarding the 
legal status of a disputed communication takes place before the moment of initial dis-
semination”). 
132. See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 913, 920 (2006) (“Freedom of speech may 
be the paradigmatic constitutional right. Despite their importance, however, speech rights 
are alienable, at least in some contexts. The Supreme Court has staunchly defended First 
Amendment rights in modern years, but it has allowed the government to restrict those 
rights in exchange for providing benefits.”). 
133. Indeed, this Article has already shown that within subsets of unconstitutional 
conditions cases—those involving the speech of public employees and those involving 
NEA grant awards—courts have unambiguously embraced penalty-sensitive logic. See su-
pra Part II.A.3, 4. The question here, however, is broader: It is whether we can character-
ize as penalty-sensitive the general rule that funding conditions are reviewed more leni-
ently than direct prohibitions. 
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of one type of sanction (i.e., the withholding of benefits), but not 
another (i.e., criminal and civil penalties), and given that the latter type 
of sanction is often harsher than the former, all key penalty-sensitive 
criteria seem to be met. When, for instance, the Court in Connick v. Myers 
permitted the government to fire an employee for engaging in speech 
that could not have given rise to a civil or criminal proceeding,134 it 
handed down what could plausibly be characterized as a penalty-sensitive 
decision. 
Conditional funding cases, however, present a special sort of diffi-
culty. Even if we stipulate that (a) governments enjoy greater leeway to 
regulate speech through funding conditions than through direct prohi-
bitions and (b) the sanction of denying benefits is systematically less se-
vere than the sanction of imposing criminal/civil penalties, penalty-
sensitive analysis materializes only to the extent that (b) causes (a)—that 
is, the relative leeway afforded to a funding condition is a consequence of 
the relative leniency of its underlying sanctions. And this is not always the 
case. It is true, for example, that the government is freer to restrict 
speech as a condition of public employment than it is to restrict speech 
by way of the criminal law.135 But does this result obtain because the gov-
ernment as employer inflicts lighter penalties than the government as 
law enforcer? Or because the government as employer cannot function 
without enhanced abilities to monitor and restrict the speech of its em-
ployees? If the latter (as the Court has often indicated136), then the dis-
parity in constitutional treatment arises not from a disparity in penalty 
severity, but rather from the idea that the special challenges of managing 
a workforce necessitate an extra degree of constitutional deference to 
the government’s managerial decisions. It is also true that the govern-
ment is freer to restrict libraries’ distribution of information through 
funding conditions than it is to do the same through criminal prohibi-
tions.137 But is that because the penalty of subsidies foregone is harsher 
 
134. 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“[A]n employee’s false criticism of his employer on 
grounds not of public concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the 
same protection in a libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the 
street.”). 
135. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (explaining that First 
Amendment does not prohibit government employers from punishing employees’ speech 
when speech is not “of public concern” or when employer has “adequate justification for 
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public”). 
136. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing govern-
ment’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees”); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2497 (2011) (“The 
government’s interest in managing its internal affairs requires proper restraints on the in-
vocation of rights by employees when the workplace or the government employer’s re-
sponsibilities may be affected.”); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 n.3 (1980) (per 
curiam) (upholding speech restriction on CIA employee). 
137. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–05 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (discussing government’s broad authority to further policy goals through fund-
1020 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:5 
than the penalty of fines incurred? Or is it because “‘when the 
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is enti-
tled to define the limits of that program’”?138 Decisions like these may 
have the effect of permitting light penalties where heavy ones are forbid-
den, but the effect may be nothing more than a collateral consequence 
of rules whose justifications lie elsewhere.139 
That said, it would be incorrect to characterize all of unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine as unrelated to the penalty-sensitive approach. 
Some conditional funding cases do incorporate penalty-sensitive consid-
erations into the constitutional analysis—drawing a clear causal link be-
tween distinctions in penalty severity and distinctions in constitutional 
treatment. Indeed, the Court made just such a move in Finley, articulat-
ing an unambiguously penalty-sensitive justification for its decision to af-
ford the government increased flexibility in setting standards for its allo-
cation of NEA grants.140 When courts employ reasoning of this sort, the 
causation problem disappears; in these cases, differences in penalty se-
verity do generate differences in constitutional results. 
The important point, then, is that the Court’s unconstitutional con-
dition cases are sui generis. Decisions in these cases sometimes will rest 
on penalty-sensitive logic, but other times will not. This being so, one 
cannot generally categorize this broad and complex area of constitu-
tional doctrine as consistently penalty-sensitive. Penalty sensitivity cer-
 
ing decisions). 
138. Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
139. There are other non-severity-related reasons for giving the government greater 
leeway to regulate through funding conditions than direct prohibitions. Courts and com-
mentators have argued, for example, (a) that funding cases are different because they im-
plicate contractual bargains between the government and its subsidy recipients, see 
Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15, 40–41 (1988) (de-
veloping theory of “how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does, and should, 
function in a variety of contexts as a check against the political perils of monopoly, collec-
tive action problems, and externalities”); Farber, supra note 132, at 915 (noting that “hav-
ing a right often means being free to decide on what terms to exercise it” and suggesting 
that contract theory provides useful framework for analyzing unconstitutional conditions 
issues), (b) that funding cases are different because the government’s freedom not to pro-
vide subsidies implies a further freedom to condition their receipt on the waiver of right, 
cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism 
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593, 597–
98 (1990) (discussing and criticizing argument), and (c) that funding cases are different 
because the government acts as proprietor rather than sovereign, Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 908–10, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he role of the government as 
sovereign is subject to more stringent limitations than is the role of government as em-
ployer, property owner, or educator.”). These arguments do not seem to depend, at least 
directly, on the relative leniency of the penalties embodied in funding restrictions. 
140. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Finley); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
317 n.19 (1980) (noting in abortion context that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity, 
without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity”). 
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tainly resides within this body of law, but it is identifiable only on a case-
by-case basis. 
c. Sentencing Enhancements. — In Dawson v. Delaware, a sentencing 
jury heard testimony about a convicted murderer’s membership in the 
white-supremacist “Aryan Brotherhood.”141 The testimony, in the Court’s 
view, “proved nothing more than Dawson’s abstract beliefs,” which 
“ha[d] no bearing on the issue being tried.”142 Hence, the First 
Amendment prohibited the trial court from admitting the evidence, and 
the Court remanded for resentencing. But the Court did not call into 
question the validity of Dawson’s original conviction; it only undid the 
results of his sentencing proceeding. In this respect, the Dawson 
holding—which passed judgment on a defendant’s sentence without 
passing judgment on his conviction—may appear to be penalty-
sensitive.143 
On close inspection, however, Dawson’s penalty-neutral colors come 
into plain view. Notice that the question asked and answered in Dawson 
was whether, and not to what extent, the belief-based evidence could bear 
on the severity of Dawson’s punishment. Even though the Court evalu-
ated a sentencing enhancement, it did so in a way that did not discrimi-
nate between large and small sentencing enhancements. The Court 
would not have cared, that is, whether Dawson’s affiliation with the Aryan 
Brotherhood had accounted for a slight uptick in a term of imprison-
ment, or had carried the more dramatic effect of converting a noncapital 
sentence into a capital one. As long as the evidence created a risk of any 
heightening of punishment, a new sentencing hearing had to be held. 
Still, Dawson is worth keeping in mind, because it illustrates an im-
portant point about penalties and the First Amendment. Central to the 
Court’s conclusion in Dawson was its concern that the sentencing jury, 
once exposed to the belief-based evidence, may have punished Dawson 
not just for his crime, but also for his beliefs. The Court thus feared that 
some portion of Dawson’s sentence reflected purely belief-based con-
demnation, driven by nothing more than a disdain for the ideologies es-
poused by Dawson and his fellow Aryan Brothers. At its core, then, 
Dawson was a case about improper motives. That Dawson received a 
death sentence was not necessarily a problem; the problem was that this 
death sentence may have stemmed from considerations that the First 
Amendment disallows.144 
 
141. 503 U.S. 159 (1992). 
142. Id. at 167–68. 
143. In the end, the Court’s decision in Dawson had no effect on his ultimate fate. 
Even with the belief-based evidence excluded, the resentencing proceeding assigned 
Dawson the same sentence that he had originally received. See State v. Dawson, 681 A.2d 
407, 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting Dawson was again sentenced to death following 
Supreme Court’s reversal). 
144. 503 U.S. at 167 (“Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had presented 
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In Dawson, the source of these considerations could be identified 
and eliminated; the Court needed only to remand the case with instruc-
tions not to admit the Aryan Brotherhood evidence at resentencing. But 
one can imagine situations in which proper and improper motives are 
not so easily disaggregated. What if, for example, the jurors in Dawson 
had discovered for themselves that Dawson was a racist and had escalated 
his punishment accordingly? What if a judge sentences a breach-of-the-
peace defendant especially harshly for the covert reason that he loathes 
the views espoused? To take a more familiar example, what if a legisla-
ture ratchets up penalties for draft-card burning, for the unspoken rea-
son that it detests the radicalism of draft-card burners? All of these cases 
share with Dawson the problem of impermissible influences on the pun-
ishment imposed on a speaker. Unlike Dawson, however, they present the 
problem in a way that reviewing courts cannot easily unravel. In these 
cases, jury, judge, and legislature leave no paper trail of their improper 
motives. Thus, a Dawson-like curative of a new and untainted government 
decisionmaking process becomes difficult to achieve. 
Perhaps, however, courts can perform the same “cleansing” act un-
dertaken in Dawson, by scrutinizing punishments rather than motives. On 
this approach, rather than identifying improper motives and preventing 
them from enhancing sentences, a penalty-sensitive court would identify 
exceptionally onerous sentences and treat them as evidencing improper 
motive. The finding of bad motives, in other words, would not lead the 
court to the reduction of excessive punishments; the excessiveness of 
punishments would lead the court to the detection of improper mo-
tives—which, in turn, would require judicial relief. 
B. Penalty Sensitivity in Other Constitutional Contexts 
The previous section identified some examples (and nonexamples) 
of penalty-sensitive free speech review. The conclusion drawn there was 
straightforward: Penalty sensitivity exists within First Amendment law, 
and its presence there is more widespread than typically has been sug-
gested. But the descriptive claim can be broadened, as a look beyond 
First Amendment borders confirms the solid doctrinal foundations of the 
penalty-sensitive approach. Indeed, as this next section demonstrates, the 
Court and its individual Justices have relied on penalty-sensitive review in 
interpreting not just the free speech right, but many other constitutional 
protections as well. 
Take Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick.145 Bowers 
presented a constitutional challenge to a Georgia antisodomy law, 
 
evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson’s part, but on the present 
record one is left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed 
simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.”). 
145. 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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founded on the claim that the law violated constitutional privacy protec-
tions. A five-Justice majority rejected this claim, concluding that criminal-
izing the acts in question did not infringe on the constitutional right to 
privacy. Justice Powell joined the opinion, but he wrote separately to ex-
press serious hesitations about the penalties authorized by the law. In 
particular, he worried that, under the law, a judge could impose prison 
sentences of up to twenty years “for a single private, consensual act,” thus 
creating “a serious Eighth Amendment issue.”146 By fusing concerns 
about the law’s privacy-infringing effects with concerns about its espe-
cially severe punishments, and by suggesting that the Eighth 
Amendment—in joint operation with the privacy guarantee—might limit 
the government’s power to punish private consensual behavior, Justice 




147. It might be argued that, given Justice Powell’s express invocation of the Eighth 
Amendment, his analysis of Bowers is better understood as an instance of straightforward 
proportionality review, not as an instance of penalty-sensitive rights review. But that char-
acterization cannot be squared with the opinion’s specific allusion to the “private, consen-
sual” nature of the conduct being criminalized, id., an allusion that makes sense only in 
reference to the Court’s longstanding recognition of a constitutional right to privacy. 
What seems to have bothered Justice Powell was not merely the prospect of a harsh pen-
alty, nor was it merely the prospect of an intrusion on privacy. Rather, it was the possibility 
of a harsh penalty coupled with an intrusion on privacy. Such an understanding necessarily in-
volves a penalty-sensitive view of the privacy right. 
Justice Powell’s Eighth Amendment analysis is unusual in suggesting that especially 
strict proportionality requirements might apply to punishments that target conduct lying 
on the edge of other freestanding constitutional protections. In theory, however, courts 
could frame penalty-sensitive free speech analysis in a manner reminiscent of this opinion, 
reading the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause to impose especially strict limits 
on the government’s power to punish expressive conduct. And such an approach would 
hardly mark a significant departure from constitutional traditions. Equal protection analy-
sis, for instance, calls for heightened judicial skepticism of discriminatory action that im-
plicates fundamental rights. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 
621, 628–29 (1969) (noting need for “exacting judicial scrutiny” to review state law giving 
voting right to some but not others); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641–42 (1969) 
(holding statutory denial of social security benefits based on length of residency created 
unconstitutionally discriminatory classification); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–20 
(1956) (holding law limiting indigent defendants’ access to appellate review of criminal 
convictions was discriminatory and unconstitutional). And free speech protections are said 
to “take[] on an added dimension” when speech-infringing action also implicates right-to-
privacy interests. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). Along these lines, Eighth 
Amendment/Due Process Clause proportionality protections might similarly strengthen 
when the punishments at issue implicate conduct that falls within the First Amendment’s 
domain. The goal of such analysis would be to locate punishments that, while insufficiently 
excessive to give rise to a “pure form” Eighth Amendment or due process violation, and 
also insufficiently speech-infringing to give rise to a “pure form” First Amendment viola-
tion, are sufficiently punitive and speech-infringing to give rise to a hybrid constitutional vio-
lation. Cf. Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 37), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974565 (on file with the 
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Consider also the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence. Here, 
the Court has held, for instance, that a criminal defendant acquires a 
constitutional right to appointed counsel when he faces the possibility of 
imprisonment but not when he faces the possibility of fines.148 In like 
fashion, the Court has refused to apply the constitutional jury trial right 
in cases involving “petty offenses,” which, as a general matter, are crimes 
“punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine.”149 
And with respect to the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury requirement, both 
the Court and the Federal Rules Advisory Committee have interpreted 
the provision’s reference to “infamous crimes” to encompass only crimes 
subject to an “infamous punishment,” meaning a punishment greater 
than a one-year prison sentence.150 All of these rulings are penalty-
sensitive in the sense that they link the validity of a constitutional claim to 
the severity of the punishment that a defendant confronts. 
Penalty sensitivity is equally apparent on the civil side of the ledger, 
where, in outlining the scope of the procedural due process guarantee, 
the Court has asserted that “the degree of potential deprivation that may 
be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assess-
ing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process.”151 In 
Goldberg v. Kelly, for example, the Court required an expansive pre-
deprivation hearing, emphasizing the “immediately desperate” nature of 
the defendant’s circumstances, and the fact that deprivation of his wel-
fare benefits would leave him lacking “the very means by which to live.”152 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, by contrast, the Court viewed the “hardship im-
posed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient” as less severe 
 
Columbia Law Review) (showing how hybrid rights analysis can permit “cross-claim norma-
tive aggregation,” under which a statute that does not independently violate either of two 
constitutional provisions might nonetheless “violate them jointly”). Regardless of whether 
such analysis is properly described as “penalty-sensitive” First Amendment review or 
“speech-sensitive” proportionality review, the end result is the same: penalty-based limita-
tions on the government’s power to restrict speech. 
148. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25, 37 (1972) (holding “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he 
was represented by counsel at his trial”); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 
(2002) (holding state must appoint counsel where conviction results in suspended sen-
tence that “may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’” if probation is re-
voked (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40)). 
149. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 (1968). For cases fleshing out the meaning 
of this rule, see, for example, Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (holding 
jury trial right applies when consecutive sentences exceed six months in aggregate), and 
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477–78 (1975) (casting doubt on “the proposition that a 
contempt [violation] must be considered a serious crime under all circumstances where 
the punishment is a fine of more than $500, unaccompanied by imprisonment”). 
150. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a)(2) advisory committee’s note (interpreting Supreme 
Court’s Fifth Amendment decision in Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937)). 
151. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976). 
152. 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
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than “that of a welfare recipient” on the ground that entitlement to dis-
ability payments was not need-based.153 Consequently, there was “less rea-
son [in Mathews] than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle 
that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to ad-
verse administrative action.”154 
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence also reveals traces of the 
penalty-sensitive approach. In McLaughlin v. Florida, for example, the 
Court struck down a Florida cohabitation law as unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory.155 To support this holding, Justice White’s majority opinion 
emphasized the severity of the law’s penalties: “We deal here with a racial 
classification embodied in a criminal statute. In this context, where the 
power of the State weighs most heavily upon the individual or the group, 
we must be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”156 Likewise, Justice Powell’s dispositive opinion in Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education drew a constitutional distinction between race-
based layoffs and race-based hiring decisions.157 The latter, he argued, 
were less problematic than the former because, “[w]hile hiring goals im-
pose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportuni-
ties, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on par-
ticular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.”158 
Both McLaughlin and Wygant illustrate penalty-sensitive conceptions of 
the equal protection guarantee. Finding a constitutional violation de-
pends not only on the classification employed, but also on the signifi-
cance of the harm the government imposes. 
Further examples come from Takings Clause and Contract Clause 
doctrine. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that 
 
153. 424 U.S. at 342. 
154. Id. at 343; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 584 (1975). Goss holds that  
[s]tudents facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection 
of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a sus-
pension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the 
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the 
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. 
Id. It does note, however, that “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of 
the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.” Id. 
155. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
156. Id. at 192. See also Justice Stewart’s concurrence, in which he said, 
There might be limited room under the Equal Protection Clause for a civil law 
requiring the keeping of racially segregated public records for statistical or other 
valid public purposes. But we deal here with a criminal law which imposes crimi-
nal punishment. And I think it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid 
under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the 
race of the actor. Discrimination of that kind is invidious per se.  
Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
157. 476 U.S. 267, 282–83 (1986) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) (contrasting race-
based hiring goals with more burdensome race-based layoffs). 
158. Id. at 283. 
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“total” regulatory takings operate in a per se fashion to trigger just-
compensation obligations, whereas nontotal takings do not.159 Likewise, 
in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court held that the govern-
ment violates the Contract Clause only when it causes “substantial im-
pairment of a contractual relationship.”160 “Minimal alteration of contrac-
tual obligations,” the Court explained, “may end the inquiry at its first 
stage.”161 But “[s]evere impairment, on the other hand, will push the in-
quiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state leg-
islation.”162 Notice that, for both of these restrictions, the Court has as-
sessed the severity of an individual’s harm not for the purpose of deter-
mining how much compensation the government owes that individual 
but rather for the purpose of determining whether the government owes 
compensation in the first place. Thus, the weightiness of the punitive 
burden placed by the government on the individual is closely linked to 
the question of whether the individual’s constitutional rights have or 
have not been violated. 
None of this is to say that cases of this kind litter the constitutional 
landscape, or that these “non-First Amendment” examples correspond in 
perfect fashion to their counterparts within the First Amendment do-
main. The existence of this case law does suggest, however, that the 
Court’s forays into penalty-sensitive free speech review are by no means 
radical or isolated events. Indeed, the examples illustrate that penalty-
sensitive analysis has surfaced within many areas of constitutional rights 
review, thus raising the question whether expanding its presence within 
free speech doctrine is a worthwhile goal to pursue. 
III. JUSTIFYING THE PENALTY-SENSITIVE APPROACH 
Part II of this Article catalogued several existing examples of penalty-
sensitive free speech doctrine. The intent was not to suggest that modern 
free speech doctrine is predominantly or even substantially penalty-
sensitive. To the contrary, the previously discussed examples may be 
viewed as departures from the penalty-neutral norm—areas of doctrine 
that are noteworthy precisely because they deviate from standard First 
Amendment practice. Even so, as Part II makes clear, penalty sensitivity is 
certainly present within First Amendment doctrine, and its presence 
raises important questions: Does penalty sensitivity make sense as a 
method of free speech adjudication? Should courts increase their use of 
the penalty-sensitive approach in free speech cases? And, if so, how 
should courts put penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysis to further 
use? 
 
159. 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–31 (1992). 
160. 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978) (emphasis added). 
161. Id. at 245. 
162. Id. 
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This next Part addresses these questions. It argues that penalty sensi-
tivity does make sense, and that courts should expand its existing presence 
within free speech law. To support these claims, this Part identifies five 
ways in which penalty sensitivity can improve courts’ implementation of 
the free speech right. Specifically, it argues that penalty sensitivity can (a) 
increase the fairness of doctrinal results, (b) mitigate chilling effects on 
protected speech, (c) facilitate the “efficient breach” of constitutionally 
borderline speech restrictions, (d) improve courts’ understanding of leg-
islative motives, and (e) promote the transparency of judicial decision-
making. The lesson to draw from this discussion is not that all First 
Amendment cases should be resolved in a penalty-sensitive fashion; it is 
rather that courts have thus far underutilized penalty-sensitive analysis, 
which, if properly undertaken, can assist in the resolution of difficult 
First Amendment cases. 
A. Fairness 
Penalty-sensitive adjudication promotes fairness. I have in mind here 
the principle that like cases should receive like treatment,163 or, more ac-
curately, its corollary that “almost like” cases should receive “almost like” 
treatment.164 Governments offend these principles when they mete out 
substantially different punishments for substantially similar forms of be-
havior.165 And courts enable such behavior when they adjudicate free 
speech claims in a penalty-neutral manner. 
To see the point, imagine a one-dimensional axis measuring the 
constitutional value of various expressive activities. Toward the left end of 
the axis are activities of low constitutional value, and toward the right are 
activities of high and recognized constitutional importance. For example, 
a comparison of different forms of sexually explicit speech might result 
in a diagram like this166: 
 
163. This principle has long been recognized as fundamental to the rule of law. See, 
e.g., Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 211 (1969) (associating principle with requirement 
that laws be general in nature); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 156 (1961) (“[T]he idea 
of justice . . . consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, summarized in the pre-
cept ‘Treat like cases alike’ and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, 
for any given purpose, cases are alike or different.”); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 237 
(1971) (“The rule of law also implies the precept that similar cases be treated similarly.”). 
164. Congress has given this principle statutory recognition in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
(2006), which instructs sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct.” 
165. See, e.g., Richard G. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on Equality and 
Desert 11 (1979) (“Every just scheme of punishment must be fair. And part of fairness is 
equality. Prima facie, equality would demand that two offenders who have committed the 
same offense receive the same sentence.”). 
166. In case it does not go without saying, the chart’s estimation of “constitutional 
value” reflects only an impressionistic and inexact reading of First Amendment law. It 
does, however, accord with the Court’s suggestions that activities toward the left end of the 
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SPECTRUM OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT SPEECH 
 
Let us stipulate that speech falling far to the low end of the spec-
trum merits no constitutional concern, while speech falling far to the 
high end of the spectrum merits absolute constitutional protection. With 
these stipulations in place, the doctrinal challenge becomes apparent: 
We must allocate constitutional protections between these two extremes. 
Applying the penalty-neutral approach to First Amendment adjudi-
cation, we simply draw a constitutional borderline at the point on the spec-
trum where constitutional value becomes high enough to mandate con-
stitutional intervention. All activities falling to the left of the borderline 
are fully punishable,167 while all activities falling to the right of the bor-
derline are not punishable at all. (On a simplified model of existing First 
Amendment doctrine,168 this borderline would rest somewhere near the 
obscenity standard of Miller v. California.169) Thus, if we were to add to 
our original diagram a y-axis measuring maximum allowable penalty se-
verity, the penalty-neutral approach would yield something like the fol-
lowing: 
 
spectrum are of lower constitutional value than the activities toward the right end of the 
spectrum. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (“The value of permit-
ting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sex-
ual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 745–46 (1978) (plurality opinion) (characterizing “patently offensive words dealing 
with sex and excretion” as “ordinarily lack[ing] literary, political, or scientific value,” but 
“not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment”); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (“The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government 
or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent.”); Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . . It 
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas . . . .”). 
167. Note that “fully punishable” here means something like “punishable to the full 
extent permitted by independent constitutional limitations, such as the Eighth 
Amendment or the Due Process Clause.” 
168. This model omits, for example, the penalty-sensitive distinction introduced in 
Pacifica and Reno. See supra Part II.A.5 (discussing evolution of penalty-sensitive doctrine 
governing “indecent” expression and communications media). 
169. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 Child  
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PENALTY-NEUTRAL APPROACH 
 
So why does penalty neutrality fail to treat like alike? The problem is 
that, as this diagram illustrates, when conduct approaches the Miller 
standard, small changes in constitutional value translate into huge differ-
ences in constitutional protection.170 This precipitous drop means that 
the constitutional regime must assign very different constitutional fates 
to very similar activities. Suppose, for instance, that Hank and Harry have 
posted lewd videos on their respective websites, and suppose further that 
Hank’s video qualifies as “barely patently-offensive” while Harry’s video 
qualifies as “almost patently-offensive.” On a penalty-neutral application 
of the Miller rule, Hank is subject to grave punishment—potentially many 
years in prison—while Harry is immune from sanction of any kind. This 
outcome is not good.171 
A modified diagram reveals how penalty sensitivity ameliorates the 
fairness problem. In most areas, the penalty sensitive approach parallels 
the penalty-neutral approach, with activities at the left end entitled to no 
 
170. This phenomenon is by no means isolated to penalty-neutral modes of constitu-
tional adjudication. For a general analysis of the problem—and a general recommenda-
tion in favor of “smoother” laws—see Adam Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws 3–4 (Feb. 
14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1992034 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing benefits of “smooth” doctrine in various le-
gal contexts). 
171. Notice that this problem has nothing to do with the standard’s lack of clarity. 
The problem, in other words, does not arise from the difficulty of distinguishing between 
“patently offensive” and “not patently offensive” speech; rather, it arises from the conse-
quences of making such a distinction in the first place—consequences that in no way de-
pend on the coherence of the distinction itself. Hence, courts cannot solve the fairness 

















Eighth Amendment limit 
 Child  
 pornography 










1030 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:5 
protection, and activities at the right end entitled to protection that is ab-
solute. But in the area surrounding Miller obscenity, the penalty-sensitive 
approach employs gradated limits—rather than a single, stark border-
line—to achieve a rough correspondence between expressive value and 
maximum punishability. Such an approach might, for example, permit 
states to punish publishers of child pornography to the full extent per-
mitted by the Eighth Amendment, publishers of Miller obscenity with a 
prison sentence not to exceed one year, publishers of pornography fal-
ling just short of the Miller standard with monetary fines, and publishers 
of indecent erotica to no extent at all.172 
PENALTY-SENSITIVE APPROACH 
 
This approach does not eliminate fairness problems, but it has a 
mitigating effect. Under this new scheme, Hank and Harry would still re-
ceive substantially different constitutional treatments (with Hank ex-
posed to the possibility of a one-year prison term and Harry exposed to 
the possibility of a fine), but the difference is less dramatic than the 
penalty-neutral alternative would dictate. Courts might also improve the 
picture by introducing new tiers, further lessening the disparities in the 
treatment of constitutionally similar acts. Eventually, the benefits of fur-
ther gradations will give way to losses in administrability, but these losses 
are not likely to be substantial when the tiers are few in number.173 
 
172. It bears emphasizing that the diagram reflects maximum punishments—not 
mandatory punishments. That is, the Court would not be telling legislatures that they must 
punish Miller obscenity with one-year prison terms. Rather, the Court would be saying that 
the First Amendment prohibits any such punishment exceeding one year. 
173. See infra Part IV.B (discussing and responding to implementation-related objec-
tions to penalty-sensitive analysis). 
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The foregoing discussion has focused on equality, but it also helps to 
illustrate a related point, grounded in the concept of proportionality. 
While penalty-sensitive review helps to ensure similar treatment for simi-
lar speakers, it also fosters adherence to the time-honored maxim that 
“the punishment should fit the crime.”174 Penalty neutrality, as the charts 
above indicate, fails to distinguish between two different inquiries: (a) 
whether speech has insufficient value to merit total constitutional protec-
tion; and (b) whether speech has insufficient value to merit any constitu-
tional protection at all. If a penalty-neutral analyst answers “yes” to the 
first question, then he must also answer yes to the second; from the con-
clusion that the government may punish a speech act lightly, it automati-
cally follows that the government may do so harshly as well. Strict adher-
ence to such a scheme raises the risk of disproportionate punishments, 
and it permits governments to punish speech carrying some First 
Amendment value as if it carried no First Amendment value at all. Pen-
alty sensitivity avoids this problem by allowing courts to take note of a 
speech’s constitutional value even after concluding that such speech does 
not warrant all-out constitutional protection. And in so doing, penalty 
sensitivity helps to prevent the imposition of punishments that are 
marked by undue harshness when viewed in relation to the expressive 
value of the act in question.175 
B. Chilling Effects 
Modern First Amendment doctrine manifests a keen awareness of 
chilling effects. Chilling effects, in the words of Professor Frederick 
Schauer, occur when “individuals seeking to engage in activity protected 
by the first amendment are deterred from so doing by governmental 
 
174. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.24 (1996) (“The principle that 
punishment should fit the crime ‘is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law 
jurisprudence.’” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983))). For philosophical 
development of this idea, see, for example, H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles 
of Punishment, in Punishment and Responsibility 1, 25 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing “the 
principle that different kinds of offence of different gravity (however that is assessed) 
should not be punished with equal severity”). 
175. One could achieve similar results by modifying Eighth Amendment doctrine so 
as to permit a “hybridized” proportionality analysis of speech-restricting punishments, tar-
geting government actions that, though not individually violative of Eighth Amendment 
proportionality requirements or First Amendment prohibitions, would still violate a pro-
portionality rule informed by First Amendment considerations. See supra note 147 (out-
lining potential hybrid constitutional analysis arising from joint application of First and 
Eighth Amendments). Federal sentencing courts, moreover, could engage in a similar 
analysis in connection with their application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), concluding that the 
expressive value of an act, while insufficient to bar its punishment under the First 
Amendment (or Eighth Amendment), at least necessitates a downward variance from the 
Guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing “[t]he court, in de-
termining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sen-
tence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense”). 
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regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”176 That is, 
governments “chill” protected speech by restricting some other form of 
speech that, while unprotected, is similar to the speech getting chilled. 
As Schauer explains, “[I]f a statute which is directed at hard core por-
nography has the actual effect of deterring an individual from publishing 
the Decameron or Lady Chatterley’s Lover, that effect is properly deemed a 
chilling effect.”177 But the same statute does not have a chilling effect if it 
merely deters the publication of unprotected hard core pornography. 
At first glance, the notion of a chilling effect may seem puzzling. If a 
statute targets only behavior A1, why would it also deter behavior A2? 
Schauer answers this question by disaggregating two distinct states of 
mind: fear and uncertainty.178 Chilling effects can arise, that is, when 
individuals fear that their participation in behavior A2 will result in an 
erroneous conviction under the ban on behavior A1, or when individuals 
do not know whether the ban on behavior A1 also encompasses behavior 
A2. A bookseller, for instance, might decline to sell nonobscene books 
for fear that the state’s legal apparatus will misclassify them as obscene (a 
fear-based chilling effect). Or he might not sell the books because he 
does not know whether they are in fact obscene (an uncertainty-based 
chilling effect).179 
The upshot of these observations is that courts cannot safeguard the 
exercise of free speech rights by protecting only speech acts that intrinsi-
cally deserve free speech protection. Rather, as Schauer explains, courts 
must take additional steps to counteract the dangers of both fear-based 
and uncertainty-based chilling effects. One strategy is to extend the 
range of constitutional protection beyond the range of constitutional 
value, thereby creating a “buffer zone” between conduct that deserves 
protection and conduct that receives it.180 The Court employed this strat-
egy in New York Times: What compelled its adoption of the “actual malice” 
standard was not the intrinsic value of defamatory falsehoods, but rather 
the need for “a measure of strategic protection” to promote vigorous and 
uninhibited public debate.181 Another strategy is to insist on precise legal 
language, thereby reducing uncertainty regarding the scope of a speech 
prohibition.182 The vagueness and overbreadth rules serve this anti-
chilling purpose by reducing the risk that individuals will mistakenly de-
cline to engage in protected expression as a result of miscomprehending 
the ambit of a speech-restricting rule. 
 
176. Schauer, supra note 90, at 693. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 694. 
179. Id. at 699. 
180. Id. at 707. 
181. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (explaining result in 
New York Times). 
182. Schauer, supra note 90, at 698–700. 
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Schauer analyzes these strategies in depth, but he does not discuss a 
third way in which courts can reduce both fear-based and uncertainty-
based chilling effects. This strategy is rooted in Schauer’s own suggestion 
that the intensity of a law’s chill “may be likened to the product of the 
probability of an erroneous verdict times the harm produced by such a 
verdict,” the “most obvious measure” of which “is the harshness of the 
penalty.”183 Schauer’s strategies target the first component of this equa-
tion: Strategic buffer zones and heightened clarity requirements reduce 
the probability of erroneous verdicts, thereby reducing the risk of silenc-
ing protected speech. But given that punishment severity also contributes 
significantly to a law’s deterrent effect, penalty-sensitive adjudication also 
can operate to combat chilling effects. 
Consider again the seller of erotic literature, who works in a jurisdic-
tion where purveying obscenity is punishable by twenty years’ imprison-
ment. Even with a pretty clear definition of obscenity, and even with a 
low likelihood of an erroneous verdict, the prospect of spending two 
decades in prison may well deter the bookseller from carrying non-
obscene books. Here, the best way to reduce chilling effects is to lessen 
the severity of the punishment—holding, for instance, that the state can-
not punish obscenity with anything more severe than a monetary fine or 
the forfeiture of law-offending publications. While leaving the probability 
of an erroneous verdict unchanged, this alteration would still reduce the 
severity of the law’s chilling effect, giving the bookseller a worst case sce-
nario he might well be willing to live with. 
This example is not fanciful. Indeed, some of the cases discussed in 
Part II illustrate just this sort of approach to the problem of deterring 
protected speech. What necessitated Gertz’s limit on presumed and puni-
tive damages was not the inherent constitutional value of negligently ut-
tered falsehoods; this much was clear from the Court’s assertion that 
“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,” whether 
caused by the “the intentional lie” or the “careless error.”184 Rather, the 
Court’s holding was designed to limit chilling effects on constitutionally 
valuable speech. But unlike New York Times, which mitigated chilling ef-
fects by reducing the likelihood of erroneous verdicts, Gertz mitigated 
chilling effects by reducing the harms that erroneous verdicts could gen-
erate. As Justice Powell explained, “[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion 
of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily com-
pounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood 
to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”185 Put 
 
183. Id. at 695–96. 
184. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“It may be urged that deliberately and maliciously false 
statements have no conceivable value . . . .”). 
185. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
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simply, the Court fashioned restrictions on punitive and presumed dam-
ages to guard against the “danger of media self-censorship.”186 
Concerns about chilling effects also account for the penalty-sensitive 
sides of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. Recall Justice 
O’Connor’s assurances in Finley that “[i]t is unlikely . . . that speakers will 
be compelled to steer too far clear of any ‘forbidden area’ in the context 
of grants of this nature.”187 Translated into Schauer’s terms, the point is 
that low penalty severity in this context operated to minimize 
uncertainty-based chilling effects; with relatively little on the line, grant 
applicants were not likely to temper their artwork to avoid offending 
even the murky guidelines that the NEA applied.188 Consider also Justice 
Kennedy’s observation in Free Speech Coalition that “[w]ith [the CPPA’s] 
severe penalties in force, few legitimate movie producers or book pub-
lishers, or few other speakers in any capacity, would risk distributing im-
ages in or near the uncertain reach of this law.”189 Here, high penalty se-
verity threatened to exacerbate the chilling effects of the CPPA: Given 
the terrible consequences of a CPPA violation, individuals would not go 
anywhere near the law’s boundaries. 
Gertz, Finley, and Free Speech Coalition all took account of the close 
connection between the severity of a law’s penalty and the intensity of its 
deterrent effect on valuable speech. But courts cannot attend to this 
connection when stuck in penalty-neutral mode. Take the majority opin-
ion in Bethel: Having evaluated the content of Matthew Fraser’s speech, 
and having then concluded that such speech should not receive protec-
tion, the majority moved on to other issues.190 Had it looked at Fraser’s 
punishment—a multiday suspension—the Court might well have noticed 
a chilling effects problem. School officials had imposed, with hardly any 
warning at all,191 a serious sanction that most students would take pains 
to avoid. What is more, Fraser’s speech achieved its effect through allu-
sion, relying entirely on innuendo that was inoffensive on its face. These 
 
186. Id. at 350; see also Carol Rice Andrews, The First Amendment Problem with the 
Motive Restrictions in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 J. Legal Prof. 13, 57–58 
(2000) (explaining Gertz rule in similar terms). 
187. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998). 
188. The Court acknowledged the connection between chilling effects and uncertain 
legal language in Spieser v. Randall, where it noted, 
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the 
lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone 
than if the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be feared when 
the complexity of the proofs and the generality of the standards applied provide 
but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position. 
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (citations omitted). 
189. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
190. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986). 
191. See id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing Fraser was not given fair notice 
of school’s prohibitions). 
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facts in tandem raised a chilling effects problem. Future student speak-
ers, aware of Fraser’s punishment, might well hesitate to give public ad-
dresses, or they might at least go out of their way to excise potentially 
controversial material from their prepared remarks. Had Fraser’s sanc-
tion not been so severe, the increase in self-censorship would not have 
been as great. By raising the disciplinary stakes to a significant level, the 
school board’s actions threatened to suppress much more than just the 
“patently offensive” speech that Bethel purported to deem out of bounds. 
C. “Preserving” Unprotected Speech 
A related, though distinct, role of penalty sensitivity involves avoid-
ing the overdeterrence of unprotected speech. This strategy begins with 
the thought that, under certain conditions, courts may wish to deny abso-
lute constitutional protection to an expressive activity, while simultane-
ously taking measures to protect against that activity’s total extinction. 
Whether prompted by uncertainty about the correctness of the constitu-
tional decision, or by the desire to fashion a compromise solution to a 
“close” constitutional case, courts may employ penalty-sensitive rules to 
reduce the deterrent impact of a refusal to protect speech in an all-out 
way. The predictable effect of such rules would be to suppress some, but 
not all, instances of the conduct denied protection—permitting the gov-
ernment to soften, but not to silence, speech lying just beyond the zone 
of absolute constitutional protection. 
The benefits of this “speech-preserving” strategy go beyond its capac-
ity to reduce the sum quantity of speech that is deterred: There is a qual-
ity dimension, as well. The key idea is this: So long as the Court maintains 
the “punitive price” of speaking at a nonprohibitive level, individuals can 
reasonably choose to flout a government’s speech restriction, calculating 
that the benefits of speaking exceed the constitutionally capped costs of 
punishment. When this happens, we can further surmise that the speech 
left undeterred is the speech that matters most to would-be speakers. If 
an individual only marginally desires to engage in the unprotected con-
duct, then the presence of even limited punishments will deter her from 
running afoul of the government’s restriction; if she yearns to speak, 
then these same punishments will not deter her. The penalty-sensitive 
rule thus functions as a screening device, filtering out instances of a 
speech act of little concern to the speaker, while preserving instances of 
the act that she values the most. 
This point is constitutionally significant for two reasons. First, insofar 
as the objective constitutional value of a speech act correlates with the 
subjective value that an individual attaches to it, the penalty-sensitive rule 
will have the salutary effect of effectively facilitating valuable forms of 
unprotected speech. Suppose, for example, that the Court were to adopt 
hard-and-fast limits on punishments accompanying contempt citations—
i.e., punishments that judges impose on individuals engaging in aggres-
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sive, profane, or otherwise disruptive forms of in-court expression.192 
Even if there were no substantive free speech restrictions on the con-
tempt power (i.e., rules identifying forms of contempt of court that were 
absolutely unpunishable),193 placing limits on the degree of punishments 
for contempt may go a long way toward preserving those forms of con-
temptuous conduct that are most worth preserving. That is because, in 
this context, an individual’s subjective desire to breach courtroom deco-
rum should at least roughly correlate with the objective constitutional 
value of his conduct. Compare, for example, two speakers: the witness 
who peppers his testimony with gratuitously profane language, and the 
defendant who vigorously protests treatment he believes to be unfair. 
Generally speaking, the penalty-sensitive rule should end up deterring 
the former sort of conduct more intensely than the latter, as individuals 
will tend to value more greatly the opportunity to protest treatment they 
perceive to be unfair than the opportunity to toss about profanities. 
From a constitutional perspective, this may be as it should be: We might 
well prefer to preserve vigorous protestations of perceived government 
oppression over needless embellishments of in-court speech, on the 
ground that the former type of communication is more likely than the 
latter to further First Amendment values.194 In this respect, a penalty-
 
192. For general discussions of First Amendment limitations on the contempt power, 
see Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial 
Contempt Power, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 477, 497–506 (1990); Ronald J. Rychlak, Direct Crimi-
nal Contempt and the Trial Attorney: Constitutional Limitations on the Contempt Power, 
14 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 243, 272–86 (1990); see also Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The 
Middle Finger and the Law, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1403, 1476–84 (2008) (examining con-
tempt power as it applies to use of middle finger gesture in court). 
193. I assume here that a desirable constitutional regime permits the suppression of 
some, but not all, disruptive or disrespectful speech acts in the courtroom. Cf. United 
States ex rel. Lynch v. Werksman, 319 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“If every dis-
respectful comment of losing counsel and litigants were to constitute criminal contempt, 
the prison population in the United States would be substantially increased and the First 
Amendment would have a substantial new exception to its protection.”). 
194. The defendant’s “vigorous protestations” seem to me more valuable than the 
witness’s “gratuitous slurs” under any number of free speech theories. One might defend 
the distinction, for instance, by reference to Professor Meiklejohn’s “self-government” 
framework, arguing that the defendant’s conduct represents a vital act of public dissent, 
whereas the witness’s conduct does not in any meaningful way promote democratic self-
government. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government (1948) (outlining First Amendment theory based on role of free speech in 
ensuring proper functioning of democratic system). The distinction also makes sense 
within a Millian “marketplace-of-ideas” framework: The defendant’s vigorous protestations 
draw attention to a competing assessment of a judge’s decision, while the witness’s gratui-
tous embellishments add little of substance to a view already being espoused. Cf. John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty 86–120 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 
2003) (1859) (defending freedom of speech as allowing for airing of competing opinions 
and, through this process, facilitating eventual emergence of truth). 
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sensitive denial of speech protection creates room for a sort of “efficient 
breach” of government imposed speech restriction.195 
Second, the penalty-sensitive rule fits well with the First Amendment 
values of enhancing autonomy and promoting individual self-realization. 
When compared to an absolute denial of speech protection, a penalty-
sensitive denial furnishes a greater degree of choice to individuals con-
templating participation in expressive activity. This choice, to be sure, is 
not unrestrained. By withholding absolute protection, the Court denies 
individuals the freedom to speak without facing punishment as a result. 
But with strict enough limits on punishment in place, the choice remains 
open in the sense that speakers can reasonably decide to absorb the costs 
of punishment—purchasing, as it were, their right to speak at a manage-
able and predictable price.196 Whereas penalty-neutral denials of speech 
 
195. Cf. Matthew Stephenson, The Price of Public Action, 118 Yale L.J. 2, 4–6 (2008). 
Professor Stephenson’s article, which is also about constitutional rights review, draws a 
similar lesson from the efficient breach phenomenon. In particular, Stephenson argues 
that “courts often can, do, and should craft doctrines that raise the costs to government 
decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies, rather than attempting 
to designate certain government actions, or categories of government actions, as permissi-
ble or impermissible.” Id at 4. His argument begins from the thought that many types of 
constitutional cases call for an implicit weighing of legitimate governmental purposes 
against constitutionally relevant harms. Id. at 5. In an ideal world, all-knowing courts could 
strike the appropriate balance between these interests, but in the real world, courts face 
serious informational difficulties in determining what this balance should be. As a result, a 
strictly category-oriented approach to judging will produce constitutional rules that either 
overprotect or underprotect individual rights. To reduce informational difficulties, 
Stephenson favors an “enactment cost” strategy, which permits the passage of constitu-
tionally problematic laws, but only in a manner that imposes significant costs on their en-
actors. Id. at 11. Such a strategy—implemented, for example, by way of clear statement 
rules, narrow tailoring requirements, legislative history canons, etc.—allows courts to dele-
gate informational burdens to the legislature without fully abdicating their rights-
protecting responsibilities. Id. at 6. As Stephenson explains, “constitutional doctrines that 
raise the costs associated with problematic government enactments may help deter policies 
that are ‘inefficient’—in the broad sense of failing a hypothetical ideal constitutional bal-
ancing test—while allowing what might be thought of as ‘efficient breaches’ of constitu-
tional rights.” Id. 
While Stephenson’s analysis identifies a means of managing informational difficulties 
on the “government interest” side of the balancing equation, my analysis here identifies a 
means of doing so on the “liberty interest” side. When, that is, the bulk of a court’s infor-
mational difficulties relate to estimating the “value” of the liberty interests implicated by a 
constitutionally problematic enactment, penalty-sensitive doctrine provides an indirect 
means of preserving the most valuable instances of a speech act while filtering out its less 
valuable variants. Just as Stephenson’s enactment cost strategy creates room for “efficient 
constitutional breaches” by public officials, a penalty-sensitive strategy creates room for 
“efficient constitutional invocations” by private actors. 
196. Penalty-sensitive doctrine of this sort might also be conceived of as implement-
ing a sort of constitutional liability rule, under which speakers are permitted to purchase 
the entitlement to circumvent a speech-infringing law at a preset price. See generally 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972); cf. David A. Strauss, First 
Amendment Entitlements and Government Motives: A Reply to Professor Merrill, 93 Nw. 
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protection allow the government to set the punitive prices at levels that 
individuals cannot seriously contemplate paying (such as a lengthy term 
in prison), a penalty-sensitive denial of speech protection may set costs 
that, given the right conditions, individuals can and will choose to en-
dure (for example, a small fine). Thus, for courts and scholars who see 
the free speech right as grounded in the value of autonomy,197 this 
penalty-sensitive approach dovetails with one of the First Amendment’s 
animating purposes. 
In this respect, civil libertarians disaffected with the Court’s inde-
cency jurisprudence should find some consolation in the penalty-
sensitive aspects of the Pacifica holding. Pacifica may not have ushered in 
a golden age of no-holds-barred programming, but the decision at least 
deserves credit for staving off a dark age of enforced blandness. And that 
is because, by stressing the importance of limited punishments, Pacifica 
withheld from the government the tool of total, nonnegotiable censor-
ship. Under the reasoning of Pacifica, when broadcasters strongly desire 
to air the seven dirty words, the government can do only so much to dis-
suade them: It can exact a price for the broadcaster’s act of defiance, but 
it cannot erect insurmountable barriers to indecent broadcasts.198 Thus, 
whatever screen Pacifica and its progeny have placed in the way of inde-
cent programming, the penalty-sensitive aspects of this case law have 
 
U. L. Rev. 1205, 1212 (1999) (“Even if the government may not forbid, buy out, or con-
demn tobacco advertising, perhaps it should be allowed to require tobacco advertisers to 
pay for the harm that their advertising inflicts.”). For elaboration on this idea, see Gerard 
N. Magliocca, Constitutional Liability Rules 23–26 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/constitutionallaw/documents/ 
Fall2011Magliocca-Constitutional-Liability-Rules.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(proposing, among other things, tax-oriented campaign finance doctrine that “hold[s] 
that corporations have the First Amendment entitlement that Citizens United identified, but 
that this right can be taxed in the interest of protecting the political system from corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption”). It bears noting that this sort of approach might 
present untoward distributive consequences, insofar as it affords deep-pocketed parties 
greater freedom to flout speech restrictions than their shallow-pocketed counterparts. 
Whether this problem merits attention from courts charged with implementing constitu-
tional doctrine—as opposed to policymakers with direct control over the distribution of 
wealth—is an important and interesting question, but it is ultimately one that lies beyond 
the scope of this project. 
197. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 11 
(1984) (arguing “the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one 
true value, . . . labeled ‘individual self-realization’”); Emerson, Toward a General Theory, 
supra note 72, at 879–81 (identifying “individual self-fulfillment” as First Amendment 
value, in light of idea that “[t]he right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the 
right of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual”). 
198. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text (discussing penalty-sensitive 
aspects of Pacifica and lower courts’ reading of case as prohibiting excessive punishment of 
indecency). 
2012] OF SPEECH AND SANCTIONS 1039 
loosened its mesh, ensuring that some forms of “unprotected” speech 
can still get through.199 
D. Government Motives 
Courts often face difficulties in ascertaining the purposes underlying 
a law with speech-infringing effects. These difficulties prompted the 
Court in United States v. O’Brien to declare that it “will not strike down an 
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”200 As then-professor and now-Justice Elena Kagan has shown, 
however, this motive-neutral approach to First Amendment law has not 
won the day. In fact, the Court often probes the reasons underlying a 
law’s enactment, and it has crafted doctrines with an eye to the problem 
of improper motive.201 Kagan has thus explained in motive-based terms 
the Court’s distinction between “content-based” and “content-neutral” 
laws, as well as its distinction between direct and incidental restrictions 
on speech. While these doctrinal categories do not explicitly reference 
government motives, they provide tools that courts routinely use to “flush 
out bad motives without directly asking about them.”202 
Penalty-sensitive review works the same way. Just as, for example, 
testing for content neutrality can serve as a “prox[y] for a direct inquiry 
into motive,” so too can scrutinizing the severity of a law’s penalties.203 
Recall, for example, Justice Holmes’s observation that anything more 
than a nominal punishment would have caused the Abrams defendants 
“to suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they 
 
199. That broadcasters continue to show indecent material notwithstanding the 
threat of punishment is illustrated by the agency’s omnibus order of March 15, 2006. See 
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 
8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664 (2006) (cataloging and imposing fines for multiple television 
broadcasts deemed indecent); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
1800, 1808–10, 1812 (2009) (describing order and upholding it against challenge under 
Administrative Procedure Act), remanded to 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidat-
ing order on First Amendment vagueness grounds), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011). 
What matters for our purposes is not whether the FCC correctly identified the broadcasts 
deserving of punishments, or whether the policy underlying the order was unconstitution-
ally vague. Rather, what matters is that broadcasters, fully aware of the potential for pun-
ishment, have continued to show indecent material. 
200. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
201. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996) (contending “First 
Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court . . . has as its primary, though un-
stated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives”); see also Paul Brest, The 
Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 
590 (1975) (using O’Brien to support proposition that Supreme Court “decisions inform 
the conscientious legislator that some motives are unconstitutional”); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 776 (2001) (arguing “the real function 
of the O’Brien test is nothing other than ascertaining the law’s purpose”). 
202. Kagan, supra note 201, at 443. 
203. Id. at 414. 
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avow.”204 If pressed to elaborate on this idea, Holmes might have said 
something like the following: 
Look, I recognize that the government has a legitimate interest 
in safeguarding wartime production, and I recognize that 
Abrams and his colleagues may have undermined this interest. 
But when I turn to their punishments, I become extremely 
skeptical of the government’s stated motivations. These people 
were puny anonymities, whose leaflets circulated within a super-
limited sphere! Any adverse effects on wartime output would 
have been negligible at best. The twenty-year prison sentences 
thus speak volumes about the government’s true motives here, 
motives relating not to a benign interest in preventing indus-
trial disturbances, but to a more sinister interest in persecuting 
dissenters. 
Applied in this manner, penalty-sensitive review serves an evidentiary 
function, smoking out illegitimate purposes in much the same way as the 
motive-oriented proxies that Justice Kagan has identified. 
The Abrams example reveals how penalty sensitivity facilitates ex post 
review of government motives. But motive-based monitoring of penalties 
can assume an ex ante perspective, as well. This Article earlier character-
ized Gertz’s bar on presumed and punitive damages as a prophylactic 
measure designed to alleviate chilling effects.205 But the rule also carries a 
motive-based justification, reflected in Justice Powell’s observation that 
permitting juries to go beyond compensation for actual injury would 
open the door to improperly motivated defamation awards. Allowing 
presumed damages, he explained, “invites juries to punish unpopular 
opinion,” and allowing punitive damages leaves juries “free to use their 
discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views.”206 Put 
briefly, the less regulated the jury’s power to punish, the greater the dan-
ger of belief-based condemnation. Thus arises the need for a limitation 
on damage awards, which guards against the risk of punishing unpopular 
views. 
The idea can also be viewed through the lens of means-end analysis. 
In its traditional formulation, this commonplace form of inquiry asks 
whether the regulatory sweep of a speech restriction is no more expan-
sive than is appropriate to achieve a legitimate (or important) govern-
ment interest. Frequently surfacing within First Amendment law, for ex-
ample, is the rule of O’Brien, which asks whether “the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of [an important or substantial government] inter-
est.”207 Penalty-sensitive analysis can involve much the same sort of exami-
 
204. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
205. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text (discussing Gertz’s role in miti-
gating chilling effects). 
206. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). 
207. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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nation, focusing attention on whether a law’s sanction is harsher than a 
legitimate government interest would require. Both Holmes’s Abrams dis-
sent and the Gertz opinion can be understood in this way. As Holmes saw 
it, the Espionage Act did not just cover more speech than was necessary 
to achieve the legitimate interest of protecting wartime supplies; it also 
punished the speech more severely than necessary to achieve the inter-
est. Similarly, as the Gertz majority saw it, defamation actions are constitu-
tionally problematic not just because they threaten to restrict more 
speech than necessary to remedy the injuries of private citizens but also 
because they threaten to punish defendants more harshly than necessary 
to achieve this interest. Both opinions identified a less restrictive means 
in a less punitive means, diagnosing tailoring defects not just in the scope 
of a speech restriction, but also in the severity of the penalties connected 
to it. 
The Court’s disposition of O’Brien itself might well have benefited 
from an analysis informed by these considerations. The tailoring ques-
tion in that case was whether the 1965 Amendment to the Selective 
Service Act (SSA)—which criminalized the willful destruction or mutila-
tion of draft cards—went beyond advancing the government’s interest in 
“further[ing] the smooth and proper functioning of the system that 
Congress has established to raise armies.”208 The Court concluded that 
the Act did not, reasoning that the prohibition covered no more speech 
than necessary to serve the substantial government interest in administer-
ing the Selective Service System.209 But by asking only the penalty-neutral 
question of whether the SSA’s substantive restrictions were narrowly tai-
lored, the Court ignored troubling facts about the severity of O’Brien’s 
punishment. As Professor Lucas Powe has noted, the district court sen-
tenced O’Brien to “six years under the Youth Offenders Act, which 
meant that he might serve four years at the Federal Youth Correctional 
Center in Chillicothe, Ohio.”210 This fact alone should have raised eye-
brows, given that “[e]ven those who refused to report for induction in 
the armed forces received lighter sentences, typically between one and 
three years.”211 Indeed, anyone convicted under the recently amended Act 
“was subject to punishment that would last longer than a voluntary 
enlistment in the armed forces.”212 And on top of everything else, some 
evidence suggested that the trial judge had imposed the maximum sen-
tence as a direct consequence of O’Brien’s refusal to renounce his politi-
cal beliefs.213 In short, these and other considerations indicated that “the 
 
208. Id. at 378–81. 
209. Id. at 382. 
210. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 326–27 (2000). 
211. Id. at 327. 
212. Id. at 326. 
213. Id.; see also Brief for David Paul O’Brien at 9–10, 75–76, O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(Nos. 232, 233), 1968 WL 129291, at *9–10, *75–76 (“[T]he sentencing judge imposed a 
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punishment was keyed not to the conduct of burning a small piece of 
paper but to the hated message the burning conveyed.”214 
The critical point is this: Even if the law’s substantive prohibitions 
reflected an adequate “fit” with the government’s interest in administer-
ing the SSA, the law’s penalties seemed far more exacting than achieve-
ment of that interest would require. In O’Brien’s case, the six-year sen-
tence was hard to square with the permissible objective of implementing 
the draft and easier to square with the impermissible objective of sup-
pressing dissent. Thus, much like the sentencing enhancement struck 
down in Dawson,215 O’Brien’s punishment could plausibly have been 
characterized as carrying an impermissible belief-based “enhance-
ment”—penalizing him not just for the noncommunicative aspects of his 
actions but also for the message that his actions conveyed. A determina-
tion to this effect would not have supported a wholesale invalidation of 
O’Brien’s conviction; insofar as his conduct was punishable to some ex-
tent, the proper remedy would have been merely a remand for resen-
tencing. The Court, however, failed to consider this possibility. In doing 
so, it overlooked an especially problematic element of the O’Brien prose-
cution. 
E. Transparency 
Recall that Justice Holmes’s decision to dissent in Abrams stemmed 
in part from a visceral unease with the lengthy sentences involved in that 
case. Along the same lines, the Court’s willingness to uphold the NEA 
guidelines in Finley derived from its comfort with the mildness of the 
“sanction” at issue there, just as its willingness to strike down the CPPA’s 
child pornography prohibitions in Free Speech Coalition derived from its 
discomfort with the high severity of that law’s punishments. These exam-
ples are noteworthy because they involve judges openly acknowledging 
the First Amendment significance of a penalty’s severity. In another 
sense, however, they may represent the tip of the iceberg. There almost 
surely exist other, perhaps many other, cases in which penalty-related 
considerations have exerted real, but invisible, effects on the outcomes of 
cases. 
 
six-year maximum indeterminate sentence with the express intent that respondent would 
serve less than the maximum if he changed his beliefs and associations.”). 
214. Powe, supra note 210, at 326. 
215. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160, 163 (1992). Dawson is not itself a penalty-
sensitive case, but it nonetheless illuminates the purposivist potential of penalty sensitivity 
analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 141–144. Understood, that is, as a case about 
motives, Dawson underscores the relationship between penalties and purposes, suggesting 
that, all else equal, the more severe an individual’s punishment, the more likely it is to 
bear the taint of improper motives. See id. And when that is true, courts can mitigate the 
influence of improper motives by limiting the penalty that the government may impose. 
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Empirical study is needed to test this hypothesis, but it requires no 
great leap of imagination to see how penalty-sensitive considerations 
might, sub silentio, affect judicial resolution of First Amendment claims. 
The literature on federal sentencing is telling in this respect. Numerous 
commentators, including some members of the federal judiciary, have 
observed that judges manipulate legal and factual findings so as to avoid 
imposing sentences they perceive to be unfair.216 Similarly, it has been 
observed that jurors become less likely to return convictions after learn-
ing that these convictions will result in especially serious sentences.217 
 
216. See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines 
in the Federal Courts 90 (1998) (suggesting “[m]any judges are not at ease operating 
within [the Guidelines system], and may be sorely tempted to manipulate their Guidelines 
calculations to avoid the results called for by the Guidelines”); Andrew D. Liepold, Why 
Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 151, 200–01 (2005) (speculating 
“judges may acquit more often because they [find] it to be the only way to avoid imposing 
an unjust sentence that they know would follow a conviction” and providing limited em-
pirical evidence supporting claim); Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing 
Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 Hastings L.J. 533, 560–61 (2007) (“[B]oth 
judges and juries are more likely to acquit as the punishment following a conviction in-
creases.”); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 357, 365 (1992) (quoting anonymous colleague’s concession 
that he and his colleagues “spend . . . time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, 
distorting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
217. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (justifying long-
standing rule against providing jurors with sentencing information on grounds that doing 
so would “invite[] them [inter alia] to ponder matters that are not within their province”); 
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era 
of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 79–80 (2003) (arguing “although it is ad-
mittedly more difficult for juries to check laws that would, in their estimation, produce 
overly harsh results when they are unaware of what the actual sentence will be,” modern 
jury “does attempt to make such predictions, and if it predicts that the punishment will be 
disproportionate to what the defendant did, it is less likely to convict”); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2450–51 (1997) (“As penalties in-
crease, people may not be as willing to enforce them because of the disproportionate im-
pact on those caught.”); Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings 
About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 621, 656 (2004) (arguing that, in rational choice model, 
“the jury’s guilt decision may be based upon assumptions about the probable sentence”); 
Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment—Allocation of Factfinding in Sentencing, 121 Harv. L. 
Rev. 225, 235 (2007) (“A jury verdict will meaningfully reflect the community’s conscience 
and rein in an overly punitive legislature only when it is the product of knowledge, not ig-
norance, about sentencing.”). Although the law review literature provides only anecdotal 
evidence for this claim, social scientists have accumulated some experimental support. See 
Martin F. Kaplan, Setting the Record Straight (Again) on Severity of Penalty: A Comment 
on Freedman et al., 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 697, 698 (1994) (reviewing experimental at-
tempts to verify existence of this phenomenon and concluding “there [is] evidence that 
penalty does affect decisions under some circumstances”). But see Jonathan L. Freedman, 
Kristen Krismer, Jennifer E. MacDonald & John A. Cunningham, Severity of Penalty, 
Seriousness of the Charge, and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 189, 190 
(1994) (“[T]here is no convincing support for [this] effect.”). And there is historical sup-
port as well. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, it was not un-
common for English juries—sometimes with the encouragement of their overseeing 
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Based on these examples, it is not hard to infer that penalty-sensitive free 
speech review sometimes occurs behind closed doors, with judicial actors 
contorting an outwardly penalty-neutral analysis to achieve a result that 
satisfies inwardly penalty-sensitive aims. 
This possibility points to a further benefit of the penalty-sensitive 
approach: If penalty-sensitive concerns are already functioning as a hid-
den variable within the First Amendment calculus, then further recogniz-
ing the legitimacy of these concerns should increase the transparency of 
judicial decisionmaking, which in turn should help everyone involved in 
First Amendment analysis—from litigants to scholars to legislatures to 
speakers—better understand the actual contours of the law. 
It is true, of course, that not every hidden influence on constitu-
tional decisionmaking should be thrust into the light of full disclosure. 
Even if we could prove the realist maxim that breakfast food influences 
judicial decisionmaking,218 we would still discourage judges from writing 
opinions about bacon, toast, and eggs. A similar claim applies to penalty 
severity: Even if judges are inwardly motivated by penalty-sensitive con-
cerns, this fact alone does not indicate that they should publicize, rather 
than suppress, such inclinations. But, as we have seen from the discussion 
above, far from being a problematic influence on free speech adjudica-
tion, penalty-sensitive analysis is in fact a meritorious method of First 
Amendment review, capable of generating fairer and more finely tailored 
rules of speech protection. Thus, to the extent that penalty sensitivity al-
ready operates as a hidden adjudicatory influence, judges should not 
hesitate to make its presence known. 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE PENALTY-SENSITIVE APPROACH 
With the justifications for penalty-sensitive review now laid on the 
table, it is worth considering potential criticisms to the practice. This Part 
takes on that task. Part IV.A speaks to a legitimacy-based critique, asking 
whether penalty-sensitive analysis usurps the legislative role. Part IV.B 
turns to objections based on administrability, evaluating the extent to 
which courts are capable of conducting penalty-sensitive analyses without 
generating arbitrary or abstruse doctrinal rules. And Part IV.C addresses 
the claim that penalty-sensitive analysis will underprotect the free speech 
right. 
 
judges—to commit what Blackstone called “pious perjury,” deliberately convicting defen-
dants of lesser charges so as to spare them from especially harsh punishments. See John H. 
Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 57–60 (2003) (describing this phe-
nomenon). 
218. Cf. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in 
Judicial Decisions, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 6889, 6890 (2011) (observing outcomes 
of parole board hearings bear statistically significant correlation to temporal proximity to 
food breaks). 
2012] OF SPEECH AND SANCTIONS 1045 
In parrying these thrusts, I do not mean to imply that penalty sensi-
tivity is immune to criticism. In fact, as the ensuing discussion will dem-
onstrate, the practice has its vulnerabilities, and these vulnerabilities, if 
not carefully attended to, can create problems. That penalty-sensitive 
analysis might cause problems, however, does not mean that courts 
should forsake the practice altogether. Rather, the presence of potential 
downsides means only that penalty-sensitive analysis should proceed in a 
manner that takes them into account. In this respect, the objective of this 
last Part is twofold: In addition to demonstrating that the problems with 
penalty sensitivity are manageable, the ensuing discussion proposes some 
ways in which courts can avert its dangers. 
A. Legitimacy 
A legitimacy-based attack on penalty-sensitive review might advance 
the claim—often articulated in Eighth Amendment and due process 
cases—that unelected judges have no business reviewing a legislature’s 
chosen means of punishment. In the criminal context, the Court has de-
clared that “[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to 
the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining 
the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discre-
tion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.”219 In the 
civil context, this same principle—though perhaps less rigidly adhered 
to220—finds expression in admonitions that courts should afford “‘sub-
stantial deference’ to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanc-
tions for the conduct at issue.”221 Along these lines, one might criticize 
penalty-sensitive review as insufficiently deferential to coordinate 
branches, arguing that it gives unelected judges too much authority to 
meddle with the difficult punitive judgments made by democratically 
elected officials. These concerns weighed on the Court, for instance, in 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana. There, in explaining the majority’s re-
fusal to consider the harsh penalties attached to an anti-obscenity law, 
Justice White reasoned that “‘it is not for this Court . . . to limit the State 
in resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law.’”222 
Arguments of this sort, however, overlook a critical distinction be-
tween pure-form proportionality review and penalty-sensitive free speech 
 
219. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
220. See Karlan, Pricking the Lines, supra note 30, at 920 (“Having embraced and 
then largely abandoned a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement of proportion-
ality under the Eighth Amendment in criminal cases, the Court has articulated an increas-
ingly robust requirement of proportionality under the Due Process Clause in punitive 
damages cases.”). 
221. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300–01 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
222. 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989) (alterations in original) (quoting Kingsley Books, Inc. v. 
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957)). 
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review. The former asks whether the severity of a penalty is justifiable in 
light of traditional punitive objectives such as retribution, deterrence, in-
capacitation, and the like. But the latter adds a key variable to the pro-
portionality equation: the constitutional value of the behavior being sanc-
tioned. What is involved here is not simply the determination that a par-
ticular punishment is, as a policy matter, too harsh or too unfair; it is 
rather the determination that First Amendment priorities demand appli-
cation of light penalties, trumping whatever policy considerations might 
otherwise counsel in favor of more exacting sanctions. Because penalty-
sensitive review requires this second sort of judgment—a judgment well 
within courts’ purview—the legitimacy objection does not carry persua-
sive force.223 
Indeed, the legitimacy of penalty-sensitive review may be said to fol-
low a fortiori from the unquestioned legitimacy of penalty-neutral review. 
Penalty-neutral analysis empowers courts to strike down sanctions in their 
entirety, while penalty sensitivity merely adds the option of lessening 
sanctions’ severity. The argument is not difficult to see. So long as courts 
wield the sledgehammer of statutory invalidation, why not hand them the 
chisel of punitive moderation? Along with the greater power to bludgeon 
penalties out of existence should come the lesser power to chip away at 
their severity.224 
This last point helps to illustrate why penalty-sensitive review, far 
from facilitating illegitimate judicial power grabs, actually comports with 
a minimalist conception of the judge’s role.225 By offering courts an inter-
mediate option between the twin extremes of “full constitutional protec-
tion” and “no constitutional protection,” penalty sensitivity can promote 
evolutionary, rather than abrupt, doctrinal change. If the Court wishes to 
protect a new category of speech, penalty sensitivity allows it to make this 
 
223. Cf., e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to 
be embraced within the Fourteenth.”). 
224. Along similar lines, Professor William Stuntz once claimed that, to the extent 
that constitutional law prohibits legislative constraints on juries’ power to acquit criminal 
defendants, it should a fortiori prohibit legislative constraints on juries’ power to reduce 
criminal sentences: 
It is hard to understand why constitutional law should make it impossible for leg-
islatures to command that a given course of conduct be punished (the power to 
acquit for any reason does away with that legislative power, at least in theory), 
and yet leave legislatures free to require that, if behavior is to be punished, it 
should be punished at least so much. Logically, the greater mercy ought to in-
clude within it the lesser. 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 596 
(2001). 
225. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court (1999) (developing theory of judicial minimalism). 
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change gradually, transitioning into a rule of partial constitutional pro-
tection, letting coordinate constitutional actors respond accordingly, 
and, if conditions seem appropriate, then proceeding to a rule of total 
protection. The Court may likewise use penalty-sensitive adjudication to 
“phase out” existing rules of speech protection—replacing them at first 
with rules that furnish partial speech protection, followed eventually by 
rules that furnish no protection at all. Penalty sensitivity, in short, makes 
possible constitutional change through small steps rather than giant 
leaps. It is therefore capable of “reduc[ing] the burdens of judicial deci-
sion,” “mak[ing] judicial errors less frequent,” “promot[ing] more de-
mocracy and more deliberation,” and providing other benefits attendant 
to the minimalist approach.226 
B. Administrability 
A more powerful objection to penalty sensitivity centers on imple-
mentation concerns. This objection posits that penalty-sensitive review—
while perhaps attractive in theory—is simply too difficult to operational-
ize in practice. Here, rather than the dishonoring of doctrinal traditions 
or the arrogation of too much judicial power, the nightmare scenario en-
visions tangled webs of penalty-sensitive rules that cannot be easily ap-
plied or understood. On this view, penalty-sensitive adjudication is bad 
because it threatens to undermine the coherence and predictability of 
free speech doctrine. 
This objection has some merit. Suppose, for example, that Holmes 
had gotten his way in Abrams, such that seditious libel was subject only to 
“nominal punishments.” This rule would leave important matters unre-
solved: What counts as a “nominal punishment”? Where do the bounda-
ries lie between speech that is fully punishable, nominally punishable, 
and not punishable at all? Does the nominal-punishment limitation apply 
only to criminal sanctions, or does it extend to civil sanctions as well? Are 
all prison sentences per se not nominal? Can fines not be nominal? If so, 
how hefty would the fines have to be? Does the rule tolerate higher pun-
ishments when the prosecution involves repeat offenders? And so on. 
Such questions do not answer themselves, and they would create un-
certainty for courts, legislatures, and potential litigants. Moreover, ques-
tions like these are likely to arise in connection with almost every penalty-
sensitive holding the Court hands down. To address the implementation 
objection, then, one must ask whether the costs of this confusion are 
likely to outweigh the benefits penalty sensitivity can provide. 
 
226. Id. at 3–4; see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 481 
(2009) (“Minimalists favor incremental steps over sweeping changes in legal norms be-
cause they fear that broadly worded decisions will undermine democratic processes, lead 
to unintended consequences, and put in place rigid rules that leave no flexibility for the 
future.”). 
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At least as a general matter, this does not appear to be a likely out-
come. To begin, one must remember that some amount of doctrinal in-
determinacy is, and will always be, a fact of legal life. The Court routinely 
adopts doctrinal formulations that require further clarification; indeed, 
“it is an essential part of adjudication to draw distinctions, including fine 
ones, in the process of interpreting the Constitution.”227 First 
Amendment doctrine is no stranger to this process. The Court, for in-
stance, has recognized constitutional distinctions between “public” and 
“private” speech,228 between “content” and “viewpoint” discrimination,229 
between “primary” and “secondary” effects,230 between “substantial” and 
“insubstantial” disruptions,231 and between many other conceptual cate-
gories of uncertain definition.232 It is difficult to see why similar distinc-
tions between and among types of sanctions would be any more difficult 
to flesh out. 
Recall, too, that the Court has already drawn, and continues to draw, 
penalty-based distinctions within many other areas of rights-related doc-
trine.233 This point is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that the 
line drawing required by penalty-sensitive judging is not an impossible 
task. Courts have exercised sober judgment in performing this task, and 
 
227. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970). 
228. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (noting that “[w]hether 
the First Amendment prohibits holding [the defendant] liable for its speech in this case 
turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern”). 
229. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) 
(noting operator of limited public forum may engage in “content discrimination, which 
may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum,” but not “viewpoint 
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise 
within the forum’s limitations”). 
230. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) 
(“We have made clear that the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the secondary 
effects of crime or declining property values has no application to content-based regula-
tions targeting the primary effects of protected speech.”). 
231. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(noting First Amendment “permits the regulation of student speech that threatens a con-
crete and ‘substantial disruption’” (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969))). 
232. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the 
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (summarizing different doctrinal rules 
governing speech regulations in “traditional public forums,” “designated public forums,” 
and “limited public forums”); United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1835–36 (2008) 
(“We have long held that obscene speech—sexually explicit material that violates funda-
mental notions of decency—is not protected by the First Amendment. But . . . we have lim-
ited the scope of the obscenity exception, and have overturned convictions for the distri-
bution of sexually graphic but nonobscene material.” (citation omitted)); Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 n.6 (2008) (“[A] law may be 
overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a ‘substantial number’ of its applications 
are unconstitutional . . . .” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 485 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982))). 
233. See supra Part II.B (discussing, among other things, due process, equal protec-
tion, and Takings Clause jurisprudence). 
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the consequences have not been disastrous. To take one example, the 
Contract Clause rule that only “substantial” impairments of contracts 
create a right to compensation is not a rule that lends itself to mechani-
cal application. But that fact has not stopped judicial actors from recog-
nizing a core constitutional distinction between substantial and nonsub-
stantial impairments, while leaving disputes at the margins to be resolved 
as they arise.234 
Second, the existence of an already-developed body of penalty-
sensitive case law means that penalty-sensitive First Amendment analysts 
need not paint on a blank canvas. In developing penalty-sensitive free 
speech doctrine, courts can incorporate distinctions they have already 
made within other areas of law—areas in which they have already spent 
time and energy elaborating on these distinctions’ meaning. We have 
seen such a move, for example, in the public employment context, where 
some lower courts employ a penalty-sensitive rule of speech protection 
derived from Title VII’s “adverse employment action” requirement. So 
too, we might imagine First Amendment adjudicators plucking other 
formulations from other doctrinal branches—for example, the “petty 
offense” rule from right-to-counsel case law, the “infamous crimes” rule 
from grand jury case law, or even the “substantial impairment” rule from 
Contract Clause case law. In this field, as in others, courts can build on 
their prior work, at once easing administrative burdens for themselves 
and reducing doctrinal uncertainty for others. 
The implementation objection must also deal with the demonstrated 
adaptability of penalty-sensitive analysis. In some cases, such as Pacifica, 
the severity of an individual’s penalty can function as a soft doctrinal 
variable, exerting some force on the validity of the free speech claim, but 
not carrying outcome-determinative weight. In other cases, such as Gertz, 
 
234. A potential problem with case-by-case identification of constitutionally problem-
atic penalties is highlighted by Professor Eugene Volokh’s discussion of judge-drawn dis-
tinctions based on the severity of crimes. See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and 
Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 1978 (2004). As Professor Volokh notes, 
these distinctions may become (and in some cases have become) unstable. Having identi-
fied a limited category of crimes as sufficiently severe to warrant application of a special 
constitutional rule, courts may feel “tempted to move the lines down, treating more and 
more crimes as severe.” Id. at 1983. So too, we might suppose that having declared that 
some speech is not punishable by one means, courts will find it difficult in subsequent 
cases to declare the speech punishable by a more severe means; or, conversely, having de-
clared that some speech is punishable by one means, courts may be unable to declare it 
not punishable by a less severe means. The concern, in other words, is that what sets out to 
be penalty-sensitive doctrine ultimately will collapse into penalty-neutral doctrine, owing 
to courts’ reluctance to follow through on promises to distinguish penalties based on their 
severity. That is a valid concern, to be sure. At the same time, the doctrines discussed in 
Part II indicate that this outcome, while possible, is far from inevitable. What is more, even 
if an attempt at implementing a penalty-sensitive rule ends up reverting back to the 
penalty-neutral norm, it is perhaps better to have tried and failed than never to have tried 
at all. 
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the severity of the penalty can function as a hard variable, taking on dis-
positive constitutional significance by way of a categorical doctrinal 
command.235 Courts might also formulate rules that occupy a middle 
place on the soft-hard spectrum, employing weak presumptions of consti-
tutional invalidity, conditioning application of a categorical rule on soft-
at-the-edges definitional criteria, or finding some other way to reconcile 
the need for flexibility with the competing need for doctrinal clarity. 
This point is important because it means that courts can tailor the 
penalty-sensitive aspects of their holdings to further whatever 
implementation-related priorities they have chosen to pursue. Pacifica, 
for example, was a self-consciously narrow decision—a point that Justice 
Stevens took pains to emphasize at the conclusion of his opinion. Among 
the many non-penalty-related factors on which the Court relied were (a) 
the timing of the broadcast, (b) the number of expletives used in the 
broadcast, (c) the nature of the broadcast medium, and (d) the type of 
program on which the expletives were featured. Pacifica, in short, “re-
quire[d] consideration of a host of variables,”236 no one of which exerted 
outcome-determinative force. Thus, in deciding Pacifica, the Court com-
mitted itself to a highly contextualized, balancing-oriented type of consti-
tutional analysis, accepting as a necessary evil the holding’s failure to 
provide clear guidance to future litigators and adjudicators of indecency-
related claims. Having made a commitment to multifactor analysis, the 
Court did not much increase implementation difficulties by adding 
penalty-sensitive considerations to the mix. Pacifica’s import was going to 
be cloudy whether or not its holding took into account the significance 
of the broadcaster’s penalty. Consequently, the Court could employ 
penalty-sensitive analysis without much adding to administrative difficul-
ties.237 
Gertz, by contrast, built on the foundation of the New York Times’s 
“actual malice” requirement—a requirement crafted in the interest of 
clarity and predictability. Here, a Pacifica-like “soft” rule would have dis-
served these values, introducing too much uncertainty into an area of 
doctrine in which the Court sought to outline a clear First Amendment 
boundary. But the Court could (and did) still embrace penalty sensitivity 
by way of a hard rule, articulating the penalty-sensitive aspects of the Gertz 
 
235. For an especially helpful discussion of the distinction between categoricalist and 
balancing modes of First Amendment adjudication, see Blocher, supra note 32, at 381–98. 
236. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). 
237. This is not necessarily to say that indecency cases are best dealt with by way of ad 
hoc balancing. All told, Pacifica’s reliance on this approach may have created more prob-
lems than it solved—providing too little guidance as to the scope of the First 
Amendment’s indecency protections and leaving too much up to the subjective prefer-
ences of regulators and lower court judges. But whether or not Pacifica’s doctrinal strategy 
was the correct one, the point here is that this strategy, once adopted, did not suffer on 
account of the Court’s willingness to treat penalty severity as one of the “host of variables” 
bearing on its resolution of the case. Id. 
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holding in precise and outcome determinative terms. Thus, just as the 
Pacifica Court structured its penalty-sensitive analysis to cohere with ad 
hoc balancing, the Gertz Court structured its analysis to cohere with rule-
based categoricalism. 
There is a final implementation-related point worth considering 
here—primarily applicable to penalty-sensitive rules of the hard variety. 
In contrast to soft rules, which purposively strive for abstractness, hard 
rules raise the problem of arbitrariness, because, under them, constitu-
tional results may hinge on criteria that appear to be unduly specific and 
untethered to the First Amendment text. Many would not respond well, 
for example, to a hypothetical rule forbidding sixty-month prison sen-
tences for an obscenity violation but permitting fifty-nine-month prison 
sentences for identical conduct or to a rule permitting school administra-
tors to punish student speakers with five-day suspensions but not six-day 
suspensions. Constitutional borderlines of this sort would strike most 
people as ad hoc, if not absurd. 
As Gertz reveals, however, judicial use of hard-edged penalty-sensitive 
rules can sidestep this problem by focusing on distinctions in kind rather 
than distinctions in degree. Thus, rather than locate a constitutional 
borderline somewhere in between the sixty- and fifty-nine-month prison 
sentence, a reviewing court might locate the borderline between proba-
tion and imprisonment, fines and probation, or other distinctions that 
capture qualitatively different forms of government-imposed punish-
ment. This way of articulating limits has the added virtue of linking the 
penalty-sensitive rule to other considerations of constitutional relevance. 
In Gertz, for example, the wall erected between actual damages on one 
side and presumed/punitive damages on the other cohered with a sepa-
rate argument about state interests—tracking, that is, the qualitative dis-
tinction between a state’s distinctively strong interest in compensating 
proven injuries and its lesser interest in simply discouraging defamatory 
speech.238 
The key point is that penalty-sensitive analysis can come in different 
shapes and sizes. When circumstances demand flexibility, soft penalty-
sensitive holdings can accommodate this need. When circumstances de-
 
238. Additionally, to the extent that numerical distinctions are a necessary compo-
nent of penalty-sensitive review, their introduction would not constitute some sort of dra-
matic transformation of the constitutional terrain. On more than one occasion, the need 
for clear guidance has compelled the court to incorporate numerical boundaries into con-
stitutional doctrine. Thus, for example, the Court has speculated that the Due Process 
Clause generally forbids juries from awarding punitive damages that are at least ten times 
greater than compensatory damages, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 424–45 (2003), it has specified that certain self-incrimination protections of criminal 
suspects lapse fourteen days after their release from custody, Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. 
Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010), and it has read the Seventh Amendment to permit six-person juries 
in civil cases, while acknowledging that “at some point the number becomes too small to 
accomplish [the Amendment’s] goals,” Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 n.16 (1973). 
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mand predictability, hard penalty-sensitive rules can be developed. And 
when circumstances demand a middle course, “in-between” penalty-
sensitive approaches are there for courts to use. None of this is to say that 
penalty-sensitive review will never raise problems in implementation. The 
wide range of options for implementing penalty-sensitive doctrine, how-
ever, suggests that challenges of implementation are manageable. 
C. Liberty 
A third objection to the penalty-sensitive approach focuses on judges 
and, in particular, penalty sensitivity’s potentially adverse effects on judi-
cial decisionmaking. This objection stems from the concern that, over 
time, penalty sensitivity may vitiate the strength of the free speech right 
by offering judges an all-too-tempting escape hatch from difficult, but 
necessary, decisions to protect unpopular speech. 
Suppose, for instance, that Judge Sympatico has before him a de-
fendant sentenced to ten years in prison for violating a fighting words law 
of questionable constitutional validity. The defendant raises a First 
Amendment claim, arguing that his conviction should be reversed be-
cause the law is unconstitutional. Judge Sympatico is torn: On the one 
hand, he thinks the First Amendment argument is pretty strong; on the 
other hand, he is reluctant to let the defendant get off scot-free. He rec-
ognizes, however, that his failure to protect the speech in question will 
result in an especially harsh deprivation of the defendant’s liberty, and 
he therefore reluctantly, but unambiguously, declares the speech pro-
tected. 
If we approve of Judge Sympatico’s decision, then we might worry 
about the consequences of introducing him to the penalty-sensitive ap-
proach. Under a penalty-sensitive framework, Judge Sympatico need not 
have chosen between letting the defendant completely off the hook and 
subjecting him to ten years in prison. Rather, Judge Sympatico could 
have said, 
It’s tough to know whether the speech was constitutionally pro-
tected; certain elements of it had expressive value, but other 
elements seemed to me plainly punishable. But at the very least, 
a ten-year prison sentence looks plainly impermissible to me. 
Therefore, I rule that you may be punished, but that your pun-
ishment may not exceed one year. 
Penalty sensitivity would thus prompt Judge Sympatico to uphold a one-
year sentence under circumstances that otherwise would have led him to 
allow no sentence at all. 
This is a troubling scenario. But does it prove that penalty-sensitive 
analysis is biased against the protection of speech? In answering this 
question, consider the same hypothetical case from the perspective of 
Judge Draco, who, unlike his colleague Judge Sympatico, tends to err on 
the side of denying speech protection. In a penalty-neutral world, Judge 
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Draco would have upheld the ten-year sentence; but in a penalty-sensitive 
world, he might prefer the one-year constitutional remedy. For Judge 
Draco, then, penalty sensitivity exerts a liberty-promoting effect, causing 
him to uphold a one-year sentence when he otherwise would have up-
held a ten-year sentence. 
As illustrated by the crosscutting examples of Judge Sympatico and 
Judge Draco, it is hard to know whether, on the whole, penalty sensitivity 
is likely to expand or curtail the free speech right. It will give some judges 
an easy way out of the distasteful decision to protect speech absolutely, 
letting them furnish partial protection to speech whose punishment they 
would otherwise fully disallow. But it will give other judges an easy way 
out of the distasteful decision to uphold a speech restriction, allowing 
them to furnish partial First Amendment protection instead of no pro-
tection at all. Which of these two effects is likely to predominate? Does 
the judiciary consist of more Judge Dracos or Judge Sympaticos? The an-
swer to these questions is not clear. 
It is worth noting, however, that within other constitutional settings, 
scholars have suggested that when the only constitutional remedy at a 
judge’s disposal is to strike down a punishment in its entirety, the judge is 
more likely to uphold the punishment than to strike it down—an in-
stance of what Professor Daryl Levinson has characterized as “remedial 
deterrence.”239 For example, Judge Guido Calabresi has identified the 
drastic remedial consequences of the exclusionary rule as a central 
source of judges’ reluctance to identify Fourth Amendment violations,240 
and Professor Sonja Starr has made a similar argument with respect to 
prosecutorial misconduct claims.241 Along similar lines, Professor Pamela 
Karlan has speculated that the “windfall” remedy of per se reversal for 
Batson violations has resulted in appellate courts “surreptitiously rede-
fin[ing] the right.”242 If a similar hypothesis obtains within the free 
speech setting, then the penalty-sensitive approach might ultimately ex-
pand the contours of the free speech right, by affording judges the op-
 
239. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 889–99 (1999) [hereinafter Levinson, Rights Essentialism]. 
240. Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111, 112 
(2003); see also Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: 
Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call To Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial 
Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 45, 53 (1994) 
(observing that “courts tend to strain the Fourth Amendment to avoid the suppression of 
reliable evidence”). 
241. Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 
97 Geo. L.J. 1509, 1511 (2009) (noting that, because sentencing reduction remedy does 
not offer “windfall” to defendant, “courts will likely be more willing to invoke it than cur-
rent, nominally stronger remedies—thus serving all remedial purposes better than the 
current all-or-nothing choices that usually drive courts to pick ‘nothing’”). 
242. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2020–21 (1998); see also Levinson, Rights Essentialism, supra note 
239, at 890–92 (discussing Karlan’s analysis in similar terms).  
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portunity to protect speech in a manner that does not commit them to 
the significant constitutional remedy of absolutely precluding its pun-
ishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Decades ago, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter waged their famous 
debates over the “balancing” and “absolutist” approaches to free speech 
adjudication. Black vigorously defended the absolutist position, arguing 
that “the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be 
no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the 
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be 
done in this field.”243 Frankfurter, who carried the balancing banner, 
strongly disagreed; he believed that “[a]bsolute rules would inevitably 
lead to absolute exceptions,” and that “[t]he demands of free speech in a 
democratic society . . . are better served by candid and informed weigh-
ing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, 
than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian prob-
lems to be solved.”244 
In assessing the competing virtues of the penalty-neutral and 
penalty-sensitive approaches, one sees obvious parallels to the Black-
Frankfurter debate. Penalty neutrality brooks no compromise within the 
punitive realm and in so doing affords comfort to those who view the 
qualified protection of civil liberties as a danger to be avoided at all costs. 
Penalty sensitivity, on the other hand, comports with the idea that the 
drawing of First Amendment boundaries is a difficult and delicate task, 
and it enables judges to carry out this task with a degree of nuance and 
refinement that penalty neutrality woodenly eschews. On the whole, 
then, penalty sensitivity should be more attractive to Frankfurter-like bal-
ancers and penalty neutrality to Black-like absolutists. 
This Article has taken the position that penalty sensitivity’s upsides 
outweigh its downsides and that judges grappling with difficult First 
Amendment problems would do well to consider the penalty-sensitive 
approach. Underlying this claim is a Frankfurterian belief that penalty 
neutrality’s “all-or-nothing” framework will often prove too blunt a tool 
for courts confronting the free speech complexities of a modern democ-
ratic society. That is not to say that penalty neutrality has no place within 
First Amendment doctrine; the penalty-neutral approach, like the abso-
lutist approach, may merit unflinching adherence in some, perhaps 
many, circumstances. But it is to say that penalty-sensitive analysis has 
been, and remains, a useful tool of free speech adjudication and that 
courts should look to expand its presence in First Amendment law. 
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